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Abstract 
This report considers the recent ‘precautionary approach’ to commercialisation of GM 
crops adopted by the UK. Accounts of precaution and precautionary practices for GM 
crops in the UK are set against the backdrop of current debate concerning potential 
commercialisation of GM herbicide-tolerant crops. In October 1998 the Government 
announced its intention for a ‘managed development’ of GM crops. A major obstacle 
to commercialisation was the controversy over the possibility that broad-spectrum 
herbicides may be harmful to wildlife habitats. In response to these concerns 
Government funded a farm-scale research programme to consider the possible 
impacts on biodiversity of growing the GM herbicide-tolerant (GMHT) crops maize, 
sugar beet, and spring and autumn sown oilseed rape. These became known as the 
Farm Scale Evaluations (FSEs). At this time the Government also sought to widen its 
risk assessment procedures to include agro-ecological expertise. Industry agreed to 
postpone commercialisation until the FSEs provided the evidence required for a final 
decision on the commercialisation of the GM crops. However, as a precautionary 
measure, the Farm Scale Evaluations (FSEs) have been controversial. Rather than 
settling these environmental matters, as originally intended, they intensified debate by 
providing a focus for people’s concerns. 
Different interpretations of precaution are evident in the accounts UK policy actors 
give of the issues surrounding GM crops and commercialisation. Some policy actors 
are concerned that the precautionary principle could be used for ulterior motives; for 
example, industry groups are concerned about the potential for precaution to stifle 
innovation or to be used as a tactic for delaying commercialisation. Others view it as 
an opportunity for greater fairness, openness and inclusiveness. Precaution and the 
precautionary principle appear to be considered by people in the UK in at least two 
different ways: as a precise ‘toolkit’ i.e. a set of steps to follow, and as a mindset, i.e. 
as an underlying or implicit aspect of a person’s perspective – that is, as something 
which is triggered in particular circumstances, and as something which is a more 
general way of acting. 
Taking a precautionary approach has involved a general process of broadening 
expertise and inclusion of a wide range of views. A diversity of views is providing a 
valuable input into a negotiation over the path that society should take. The views are 
also highlighting uncertainties other than those dealt with by the scientific risk 
assessment process, such as uncertainties concerning biodiversity, co-existence of 
different types of agriculture, and the future of agriculture more generally. 
The Government has been concerned over the lack of public confidence in decision-
making processes. The establishment of the Agriculture and Environment 
Biotechnology Commission (AEBC) in 2000 aimed to build greater public confidence 
in the way Government dealt with issues other than the science. The AEBC’s 
membership represents the broad spectrum of views on GM crops. Its members have 
sought ways for concerns to be more formally elicited, analysed and documented. 
The AEBC has been influential on Government thinking and action, particularly 
through its publications, which have raised the profile of criticisms of current risk 
regulation structures and have been a catalyst for deeper consideration of GM issues 
by all stakeholders. The AEBC has applied pressure on the Government for public 
policies and regulatory frameworks to expose and embrace the different views that 
exist on GM crops and to develop shared understandings. This pressure led 
Government to agree to hold a more formal, open, process of public debate alongside 
a review of the scientific issues of GM crops and a study of the costs and benefits of 
GM crops. 
The formal public debate, called ‘GM Nation?’, represents an intentionally more 
formal approach to broadening expertise. ‘GM Nation?’ was an attempt to link expert 
judgements with broader public concerns for GM crops, and provided an opportunity 
for developing mutual learning. It was also an attempt to create an arena in which lay 
people could participate and therefore represented a step forward in the conduct of 
public consultation for policy decision-making processes in the UK. However, ‘GM 
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Nation?’ has done little to bring views closer together. It has also been criticised for 
the way that it was organised and financed. Throughout ‘GM Nation?’ it remained 
unclear how the ‘public’ views were to be fed into the overall decision. Further, there 
has been little advice provided to government as to how to deal with the wealth of 
perspectives, demands and expectations such processes generate. 
Following the results of the formal public debate, and taking into consideration the 
results of the FSEs, the science review and the costs and benefits study, in January 
2004 the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Margaret 
Beckett, publicly stated the Government’s intention to adopt a ‘precautionary 
approach’ to GM crops. Government announced that it would allow the commercial 
production of one GM crop, GMHT maize, until October 2006, subject to certain 
conditions. However, Bayer CropScience has since decided to discontinue its efforts 
to commercialise this GM forage maize in the UK. 
The increasing likelihood of the commercialisation of GM crops in the UK has resulted 
in co-existence and liability becoming central to discussions. The issue of co-
existence of GM and non-GM crops has highlighted not only the conflicting views of 
the organisations representing diverse farming communities within the UK, but also 
the tension between the national and local positions on GM crops. 
Thus new approaches to the policy process are providing new opportunities for 
learning. There is greater communication between government advisory committees, 
and between those committees, NGOs and the wider public. Government structures 
are increasingly opening up, both intentionally and unintentionally, to wider expertise. 
As a result, Government has broadened its view of uncertainty as it has gradually 
accepted that decisions on commercialisation are more complex than it originally 
thought. Research agendas have broadened in response to queries from ACRE and 
the AEBC. Research is not simply providing ‘evidence’ for making policy decisions, 
but is contributing to a broader process of learning as policy actors rethink the policy 
problems. As research is used to endorse different opinions and further fuel debates 
it is contributing to a broader view of GM crops. Further, in highlighting the potential 
problems with GM crops, policy actors have raised the profile of wider issues, such as 
those associated with conventional agriculture or with the introduction of new 
technologies more generally. However, the opening up of government processes has 
yet to result in a calming of objections to the commercialisation of GM crops or 
criticisms surrounding scientific expertise. Yet events in the UK suggest that the 
period of the voluntary agreement with industry over commercialisation has been 
used constructively by the UK to further develop a ‘precautionary approach’, whose 
components and outcomes are being closely observed by other member states. 
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Main findings 
Introduction
Although the precautionary principle has been widely accepted in Europe as a basis 
for decision making about GM crops, there are many perspectives on its 
interpretation and how it should be implemented. The PEG project has analysed how 
current European practices compare with different accounts of the precautionary 
principle. It has been examining different policy actors’1 accounts of precaution and 
their views on the procedures for regulating and managing GM crops, in seven EU 
member states.2 This report comments on the precautionary approach adopted in the 
UK. 
Accounts of precaution and precautionary practices for GM crops in the UK are set 
against the backdrop of current debate concerning potential commercialisation of GM 
herbicide tolerant crops (see Annex I for a list of recent events). Biotechnology is 
viewed in the UK, by central government and proponents, as a way of increasing 
agricultural efficiency and attracting investment to create a more competitive industry. 
However, the statutory nature conservation agencies have expressed concern that 
the implementation of GM crops may be in conflict with measures that are designed 
to protect the environment. 
In October 1998 the Government3 announced its intention for a ‘managed 
development’ of GM crops. A major obstacle to commercialisation was controversy 
over the possibility that broad-spectrum herbicides might be harmful to wildlife 
habitats. Concern has been particularly acute as 69% of the land in the UK is 
registered as agricultural holdings and there are few remaining ‘wild’ areas. In 
response to these concerns, Government funded a farm scale research programme 
to consider the possible impacts on biodiversity of growing the GM herbicide-tolerant 
(GMHT) crops maize, sugar beet, and spring and autumn sown oilseed rape. This 
programme became known as the Farm Scale Evaluations (FSEs). At this time the 
Government also sought to widen its risk assessment procedures to include agro-
ecological expertise. Industry agreed to postpone commercialisation until the FSEs 
provided the evidence required for a final decision on the commercialisation of the 
GM crops. 
It was intended that the FSEs would settle matters regarding the effects of GM crops 
on biodiversity and enable commercialisation to go ahead. The Advisory Committee 
on Releases to the Environment (ACRE), a body whose membership included a 
range of views, had assessed the safety and health risks of the crops and concluded 
that they were safe. However, other concerns remained, for example, over the 
independence of risk research, the lack of inclusion of socio-economic issues or 
ethics in the assessment process, the effect on farm economics, the impact of 
agricultural intensification and the way that post-marketing monitoring measures 
would be implemented. In June 2000, in response to these other concerns and the 
lack of public confidence in GM issues, the Government established the Agriculture 
and Environment Biotechnology Commission (AEBC). The Commission’s 
membership incorporated the range of views on GM crops. The members were 
charged with advising Government on the broader issues associated with 
biotechnology, including current and future developments in biotechnology in relation 
to agriculture and the environment, and with drawing in the public view. 
                                                     
1 In this research we take a broad view of the term ‘policy actors’ considering it to refer to all those 
engaged in contributing to the policy making process. 
2 The PEG project has research partners in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Spain, and the 
Netherlands. The project is co-ordinated by the UK team. 
3 The term ‘Government’ in this report generally refers to the UK National Government, which includes the 
devolved administrations of the Scottish Executive, the Welsh Assembly and the administration in Northern 
Ireland. 
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Following the EU adoption of the revised Deliberate Release Directive, 2001/18/EC, 
the revised directive was transposed into national law. In England the Genetically 
Modified Organisms (Deliberate Release) Regulations 2002 came into force on 17 
October 2002. Similar regulations came into force for Scotland and Wales in 
December 2002, and for Northern Ireland in April 2003. The strengthening of 
environmental risk assessment under Directive 2001/18/EC has received support 
from all policy actors, although not without some criticism (see Section 3.1.2.2). 
Industry representatives, for example, expressed concern that the new directive might 
mean a tougher system that would impede development of the technology, leaving 
them at a competitive disadvantage. Environmental NGOs welcomed a more 
precautionary regime but felt it did not go far enough (DEFRA, 2002b). They felt that 
the amended directive still did not adequately address socio-economic and ethical 
issues, which, they argued, should be considered alongside the science-based 
issues. 
Similar concerns about the regulation of GM crops were raised by the AEBC in their 
first published report, which was on the Farm Scale Evaluations (AEBC, 2001b). To 
address these concerns, one of the recommendations of this report was that the 
Government should initiate a formal national debate on GM crops. This 
recommendation was accepted by Government and a formal debate took place 
between 2002 and 2003. During the course of the formal debate (see Steering Board, 
2003), many different perspectives on GM crops were gathered. In parallel, a review 
of the science (GM Science Review Panel, 2003, 2004), and a study of the costs and 
benefits (Strategy Unit, 2003) were also carried out. Research on people’s views was 
additionally undertaken by the Food Standards Agency (FSA, 2002). 
In autumn 2003 the results of the Farm Scale Evaluations were published (Burke, 
2003) and the AEBC produced their second report, on co-existence and liability 
issues (AEBC, 2003). Having considered all this evidence, and following the advice 
from ACRE, on 9 March 2004 the Government outlined its ‘precautionary approach’ 
to GM crops. At the time, the Secretary of State for the Environment commented: 
‘I believe the approach I have outlined today is the right one. It is 
precautionary. It is evidence-based. In practice it means licensing one 
application, which runs till October 2006, and is subject to two further 
conditions’ (DEFRA, 2004b). 
Of the four crops tested in the FSEs, the Government gave a cautious go-ahead to 
the commercialisation of GMHT maize (which already had Part C marketing consent) 
and commented that it would oppose EU approval for the EU-wide commercial 
cultivation of GMHT beet and oilseed rape. Further, the commercial cultivation of the 
GMHT maize would only be allowed if restrictions were imposed on its EU marketing 
consent so that the maize could only be grown and managed as in the FSEs, or 
under conditions that would not result in adverse effects on the environment. The 
Government also commented on its intention to consider options for compensation to 
non-GM farmers for any financial loss, but imposed responsibility for such a scheme 
on industry, stating that ‘any such compensation scheme would need to be funded by 
the GM sector itself, rather than by Government or producers of non-GM crops’ 
DEFRA (2004b) (see Section 3). 
Throughout the process of gathering evidence for this decision policy actors raised 
concerns and sought to influence policy. The following sections discuss our findings 
concerning these influences and four aspects of precaution that emerged – 
precaution as requiring more research, as assessing risks and applying management 
measures, as a process of broadening expertise, and as a learning process. Our 
research drew on documents produced by all those concerned with GM issues and 
on the wealth of material generated by the formal public debate. Face-to-face 
interviews and telephone conversations were conducted with a range of 
representatives from Government, farmers’ groups, environmental non-government 
organisations (NGOs), consumer organisations and industry (see Annex II). A 
scenario workshop with key policy actors was also used to inform the analyses (see 
Oreszczyn, 2003). Further details on methods may be found in Section 4. The next 
section comments on the ‘precautionary approach’ to GM crops in the UK. 
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The precautionary principle and different approaches to 
precaution 
Different interpretations of precaution are evident in the accounts policy actors give of 
the issues surrounding GM crops and commercialisation. While there are common 
elements to the views of Government, scientific experts, industry and environmental 
NGOs, differences surround the uses of the precautionary principle in practice (see 
Section 2). In the UK there has been no common view or consistent approach to the 
precautionary principle, even within government departments, as acknowledged by 
an interdepartmental report (ILGRA, 2002). Further, as noted by the Food Ethics 
Council (2003), the precautionary principle is only loosely defined in UK policy. 
Different themes emerge as elements of people’s thinking on precaution. Some 
people are concerned that the precautionary principle could be used for ulterior 
motives; for example, industry groups are concerned about the potential for 
precaution to stifle innovation or to be used as a tactic for delaying commercialisation. 
Others view it as an opportunity for greater fairness, openness and inclusiveness 
(see Table 1). 
Table 1 Emerging perspectives on precaution and GM crop 
Emerging perspectives – 
key themes 
Examples from documents and interview material 
Precaution as 
proceeding with care 
Precaution is something people do anyway, that they 
exercise all the time. Industry does it already with new 
products. 
Precaution is about ‘proceed with great care’ – the 
precautionary principle is exercised all the time in areas 
where there is incomplete knowledge.  
Precaution as good 
science 
It is a necessary part of good scientific practice. 
Precaution as a rational 
approach/framework for 
decision making 
Implementing the precautionary principle should not be 
based on emotions. 
Some stakeholders are particularly keen that a greater 
following for the EC’s communication on the 
precautionary principle will lead to a more rational 
approach to decision making. 
Arguments against irrational precaution refer to the way 
no harm has happened yet – no detrimental health 
effects, no contamination of organic agriculture during 
field trials. 
Precaution as a means 
for greater openness 
Transparency is particularly important for NGOs and 
farmer groups. For example, calls for results of any 
monitoring programme to be in the public domain. 
The AEBC is a good example of attempts at openness 
in Government advisory committees. 
Precaution as a 
mechanism for placing 
policy decisions within a 
societal context 
We should question the need for the technology in the 
first place. 
It should also mean the inclusion of an evaluation of all 
possible options. 
Precaution should involve widening decisions beyond a 
narrow scientific base. 
Precaution as a pretext The public debate will be indecisive, Government will 
use it to back their decision either way. 
Precaution as inclusive Precaution means including more views. 
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The public debate is viewed as playing an important role 
in opening up the debate. 
Precaution as fair The costs and benefits of GM crops are not necessarily 
evenly distributed. 
NGOs call for consideration of this in the assessment 
process. 
Precaution as a means 
for stifling innovation 
Concern that the precautionary principle will be used to 
prevent technological developments. 
Commercialisation of GM crops will go ahead, it is just a 
question of time. The precautionary principle should not 
be invoked to slow development down. 
Precaution as a delaying 
tactic 
Precaution is viewed as slowing things down, to delay 
the decision–making process for as long as possible. 
Given time the public will change their views and this will 
be reflected in Government decisions. 
Precaution as an 
iterative and flexible 
process 
Moving with the situations as they change, as the 
technology develops. Precautionary measures need to 
be flexible, they need to be appropriate to the different 
products and contexts. 
Precaution as a 
reputation enhancer/as 
demonstrating 
responsibility 
Business may utilise precaution to demonstrate their 
ability to be responsible. There is a growing realisation 
that it is an essential element in the corporate 
environment. 
Growing concern over the way that NGOs/media 
conduct themselves in GM debates – calls for greater 
responsibility. 
Precaution as a long 
term view 
Provides an opportunity to consider the future – should 
be a long term rather than a short term view. 
Precaution as irrelevant No commercialisation of GM crops would mean there is 
no need for precaution. 
The variety of themes highlighted in Table 1 relates to the different views on 
precaution held by different policy actors. Industry has developed its own 
precautionary approaches, either in the form of set guidelines or codes of conduct. 
Biotechnology companies take the view that if adequate risk assessment and 
management procedures are in place then there is no need for further action based 
on the precautionary principle. They consider that caution is employed at all stages of 
product development automatically as they would not wish to bring to market a 
product that was unacceptable to their customers and therefore had no market. They 
have little sympathy for the organic farming lobby who oppose the introduction of GM 
crops, accusing them of adopting an ideological position for their own commercial 
gain. They feel uncomfortable about further public engagement in processes where 
public concerns may be based on emotion rather than sound science. Industry 
remain convinced that GM crops are safe to human health and the environment and 
that management practices can be employed to ensure that non-GM farmers are 
protected. Measures such as the FSEs are seen as demonstrating precaution 
through greater scrutiny of the science. They therefore see no real justification for 
employing further precautionary measures, which they say would prevent GM crop 
commercialisation. 
For environmental NGOs, the precautionary principle is viewed more as a framework 
for being precautionary than as a set of rules for triggering the precautionary 
principle, which is the way the principle is seen in the EC’s Communication (EC, 
2000). NGOs believe the precautionary principle should encompass a careful 
weighing up of all the costs and benefits of GM crops and consideration of who 
benefits and why, rather than simply an assessment of the health and environmental 
risks. For NGOs, a precautionary approach would mean taking a number of actions. 
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For example, it would mean the regulatory process taking the assessment of risk 
acceptability as seriously as the evaluation of the level of risk; withdrawing marketing 
consents for all GM foods until there has been a review of their safety; ending the use 
of substantial equivalence for testing GM food safety; introducing a monitoring 
scheme that allows the assessment of the short and long-term effects of eating GM 
foods; weighing up alternatives among GM and non-GM options; and assessing 
secondary effects, such as herbicide residues in GM plants. Whereas industry puts 
faith in the Government to apply the precautionary principle in the regulatory process, 
environmental NGOs are critical of the Government’s ‘expert’-led, top-down 
approaches to risk regulation and the lack of recognition of broader societal concerns. 
Experts are viewed as being insulated from the risks, and communication is seen as 
often being one-way. 
With respect to the EC Communication on the precautionary principle (EC, 2000), 
interviewees were aware of the document, which they considered to be useful or a 
step in the right direction, but they had not necessarily referred to it recently or did not 
necessarily know its content in detail. Government and some organisations, such as 
the Consumer’s Association (see Consumer’s Association, 2002), the Crop Protection 
Association, and English Nature have been developing their own interpretations of 
the precautionary principle, some based on the EC Communication, translating the 
principle into practical guidelines for dealing with uncertainties in their own particular 
field. In its report Crops on Trial (AEBC, 2001b), the AEBC comments that a 
precautionary approach should be holistic, protecting those affected by an activity 
rather than those who benefit, acknowledging the complexity of the real world and 
recognising the vulnerability of the natural environment. Other organisations do not 
necessarily articulate their views on the precautionary principle, rather, it appears to 
be an underlying feature of their perspectives. They rarely use the word uncertainty in 
the narrow way it is used in the EC Communication, which refers primarily to scientific 
uncertainty, and consider precaution to be more a general way of acting. 
Precaution and the precautionary principle therefore appear to be considered by 
people in at least two different ways: as a precise ‘toolkit’, i.e. a set of steps to follow, 
and as a mindset, i.e. as an underlying or implicit aspect of a person’s perspective. 
This difference has also been noted by Willis and Oldham (2002), who considered the 
precautionary principle in general, rather than specifically in relation to GM crops. A 
tension therefore exists between the need for more formal approaches to precaution 
with a clear procedure based on science and scientific expertise, as set out in the EC 
Communication (EC, 2000), and a more open process – that is, between something 
which is triggered in particular circumstances, and something which is a more general 
way of acting. Formal approaches are favoured at the European policy level and by 
industry. However, for GM crops in the UK, precaution in practice has tended to 
operate using an informal, process-based interpretation of the precautionary principle. 
Taking a precautionary approach, on the part of different actors, has involved a wide 
range of views, providing a valuable input into a negotiation over the path that society 
should take. These views (about precaution generally and GM crops in particular) 
have highlighted uncertainties other than those dealt with by the scientific risk 
assessment process, such as uncertainties concerning biodiversity, co-existence of 
different types of agriculture, and the future of agriculture more generally. A formal 
commitment by Government to adopt a ‘precautionary approach’ came with the 
announcement of its decision on GM crops, discussed below. 
The Government decision on the commercialisation of 
GM crops in the UK 
In January 2004 the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 
Margaret Beckett, announced the Government’s decision to license one GM crop 
application, GMHT maize, until October 2006, subject to certain conditions. At the 
same time, she publicly stated the Government’s intention to adopt a ‘precautionary 
approach’ to GM crops, commenting ‘I believe the approach outlined is the right one. 
It is precautionary.’ (DEFRA, 2004c). 
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The decision to allow the commercialisation of GMHT maize was unpopular with 
many policy actors. While industry representatives welcomed the Government’s 
decision as a step forward, they remained concerned that the decision was ‘very 
cautious’ (CropGen, 2004). In the industry view, precaution could mean ‘stifling 
innovation’ or a ‘delaying tactic’, as noted in Table 1. The National Farmers’ Union 
(NFU) also gave their cautious approval, but remained concerned over who would be 
liable should anything go wrong, i.e. ‘precaution as fair’. Organic farmers and the 
devolved administrations commented on the unresolved issues concerning co-
existence. Environmental NGOs pointed out that the risks outweigh the benefits and 
accused the Government of failing to listen to the views of consumers (referring to the 
public’s negative views outlined in the report on the formal public debate), i.e. 
‘precaution as inclusive’ in Table 1. At the time, the director of Friends of the Earth 
commented: 
‘The Government has given the thumbs up to GM maize, and shown two 
fingers to the British public. In demonstrating its pro-GM credentials, the 
Government has ignored considerable scientific uncertainties, shown 
contempt for parliament and utterly disregarded public opinion.’ (FoE, 
2004). 
Bayer CropScience subsequently announced that it would ‘discontinue further efforts 
to commercialise GM forage maize in the UK’ as they now considered it would be 
uneconomic (Bayer press release, 31 March 2003). The constraints Government had 
placed on the approval provoked Bayer to comment: 
‘The specific details (of the conditions) are still not available and thus will 
result in yet another ‘open-ended’ period of delay. These uncertainties and 
undefined timelines will make this five-year old variety economically non-
viable.’ (Bayer press release, 31 March 2003). 
This decision was viewed as something of a victory by those sceptical of GM crops. 
An evidence-based decision 
In line with a wider move towards more evidence-based approaches to policy 
decisions in the UK, the Government has been keen to ground any decision on GM 
crops firmly on evidence. Building the evidence-base has involved not simply 
focusing on scientific research but also on socio-economic research and the views of 
the wider public. This has been key to enabling the Government to meet its 
obligations under the European Deliberate Release Directive while at the same time 
acknowledging that stakeholder concerns go beyond those dealt with by the usual 
scientific risk assessment process. Constructing a wider evidence base provided 
grounding for the Governments ‘precautionary approach’. It also served as a 
constructive use of the period of the voluntary moratorium on GM crops. 
However, building the evidence base has tended to mean building the scientific 
evidence base. Responding to the formal debate process, Margaret Beckett stated 
that the Government had carefully listened to people’s views and considered all the 
evidence: 
‘In deciding our policy on GM crops we have given due consideration to 
the findings of all three strands of the GM dialogue’. 
However, she added that: 
‘We have concluded that case-by-case regulation of GM crops remains the 
right approach. We are committed to evidence-based policy making and 
the scientific evidence supports neither an outright ban nor a blanket 
acceptance of GM crops.’ (DEFRA, 2004a). 
While the Government acknowledged that there were gaps in the knowledge base, 
they commented that this is true of any developing technology. The Government 
accepted the conclusions of the economics study that GM crops may be of limited 
economic value in the UK at present. However, they concluded that future 
developments have the potential to provide ‘wide ranging benefits to farmers and 
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consumers’. The following section considers the construction of the evidence base for 
the Government’s decision. 
Regulatory measures: precaution as building the 
evidence base 
This section considers the key evidence used by the Government for making its 
decision on the commercialisation of GM crops. Although the focus was on gathering 
scientific evidence, the economic impacts of GM crops were also investigated, along 
with an investigation of the wider public views in a formal process of public debate. 
The Farm Scale Evaluations played a significant role in the Government’s 
‘precautionary approach’ and are discussed first. Details of other recent scientific 
research in the UK may be found in Annex III. 
The Farm Scale Evaluations 
The Farm Scale Evaluations (FSEs) research programme began in 1999 (DEFRA, 
2002b) following concerns over the impacts of GMHT crops on the environment. The 
evaluations were funded by Government and run by a consortium of independent 
researchers. They investigated how growing genetically modified crops might affect 
the abundance and diversity of farmland wildlife as compared with conventional 
crops. The crops involved were herbicide-tolerant winter and spring oilseed rape, 
maize and sugar beet. The evaluations lasted for four years and represented the 
world’s largest GM crop field trials (Burke, 2003). As noted by English Nature (House 
of Commons, 2004), this was the first time that a major new technology had been 
examined for its impact on a farming system (see Section 3.1.1.1). 
The results of the spring oil seed rape, maize and beet trials were published in 2003 
(The Royal Society, 2003). The results for winter sown oilseed rape, the crop most 
commonly grown in the UK, were expected later, in 2004 (House of Commons, 2004). 
Fewer weeds were observed in the fields planted with GMHT beet and oilseed rape 
than those planted with conventional crops. For maize, more weeds were found in the 
fields planted with GMHT maize. The researchers therefore concluded that growing 
GMHT beet and spring rape on a large-scale might exacerbate the long-term decline 
of arable weeds and disadvantage wildlife, while growing GMHT maize might benefit 
farmland birds (The Royal Society, 2003). In commenting on the results, both 
scientists and industry were keen to emphasise the importance of farm management 
practices in determining the impact of growing GM crops on wildlife and the 
environment. They further pointed out that the trials were never intended as a test of 
GM crops themselves but of the way GM crops may be used. In their statement on 
the results, the industry body the Agricultural Biotechnology Council (abc) 
commented that: 
‘genetic modification is a tool which can be used in different ways with 
different management practices resulting in different outcomes’, adding 
that ‘none of the studies published this year support the banning of any 
GM crops.’ (abc web site, March 2004). 
As anticipated by the UK scenario workshop held with key policy actors in mid-2003 
as part of this project (see Oreszczyn, 2003), the FSEs led to further arguments over 
the interpretation of the results and their value for making a decision on 
commercialisation, particularly as the decision was made before all the results were 
published. Critics were concerned that the FSEs provided only limited data and not a 
definitive risk assessment. For example, critics’ submissions to ACRE expressed 
concerns about the lack of reporting of crop yields, the use of herbicides in 
conjunction with GM crops in a real farming situation, the exclusion of wider 
environmental and health effects, the lack of a comparison with organic farming, and 
the lack of monitoring of relevant species, such as earthworms (ACRE, 2004). The 
use of conventional agriculture as a bench mark for the comparison with GM 
agriculture, rather than less-intensive and more environmentally-friendly methods, 
was particularly criticised. In December 2003, an all-party parliamentary committee 
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inquiry was carried out into the value and relevance of the FSEs and to consider 
some of these concerns (House of Commons, 2004). This committee, like other 
groups and individuals such as Friends of the Earth and the former Environment 
Minister Michael Meacher, questioned the validity of the FSE results because they 
involved the use of atrazine, a chemical being phased out in the EU. The 
parliamentary committee recommended that commercial planting should not occur 
until the crop had been re-trialled without the use of atrazine. Commenting on the 
FSE results, they also noted that ‘there is still a certain unwelcome inconclusiveness 
to what is an unfinished process’ (House of Commons, 2004). In making its decision 
to commercialise GMHT maize, the Government has gone against the 
recommendations of this committee. However, Government recognised that the FSEs 
provide only part of the environmental impact assessment, and admitted that the 
FSEs may not reflect the effects of general commercialisation. 
Despite the criticisms, the FSEs heralded a new style of more open research practice 
in the UK. Their high profile led to a demand for every aspect to be subject to scrutiny 
and for details such as the location of the trials to be publicly available. They were 
proclaimed as an example of ‘best science’ (Solesbury, 2003), in that the research 
was well resourced, with careful attention given to every aspect. 
The science review 
The Government has acknowledged that there are differing interpretations of the 
scientific evidence base for GM crops. A more thorough examination of the scientific 
research, and of the divergent views among scientists, was recognised as a 
necessary part of the public consultation exercise. In August 2002 the Government 
set in motion a Science Review to complement the formal public debate (see Section 
3.1.1.2). As part of its remit, the Science Review Panel gave special attention to 
uncertainties, unknowns and gaps in knowledge. It did not aim to conduct an 
exhaustive survey of all that is known. Instead, people’s concerns were allowed to 
drive the review, which examined the evidence for harm and also the evidence for 
absence of harm. The Panel was chaired by the Government’s chief scientist and the 
evidence was assessed by a broad range of non-specialists, social scientists and 
scientists. The panel concluded that there were no known health effects from GM 
foods, but that ‘absolute safety does not exist’. It advocated that regulation should 
proceed on a case-by-case basis, as it does at present. It recommended further 
research on food allergies, potential changes in soil ecology and farmland 
biodiversity, and the consequences of gene flow (GM Science Review Panel, 2003). 
All sides of the GM debate considered the report to substantiate their particular 
perspective and in their responses drew on aspects of the report that supported their 
views. For example, the anti-GM lobby commented that the report recognised the 
limitations of the technology and testing regime and reiterated their concerns about 
the experimental nature of such a new technology. The wildlife conservation body, 
English Nature, was encouraged by the way it highlighted the potential effect on 
farmland wildlife as a key issue. Industry welcomed the support of the requirement for 
a case-by-case approach to regulation and felt that the report endorsed their view 
that there are no observed effects on health. 
The economics study 
In parallel with the Science Review, the Government also initiated an economics 
study to consider the costs and benefits of GM crops. This was carried out by the 
Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (Strategy Unit, 2003). Like the Science Review the 
study considered the views of the wider public as well as experts and was carried out 
by a multidisciplinary team. It commented on the economic impacts of GM crops in 
other countries as well as the UK. The analysis did not adopt a conventional cost-
benefit approach; rather, it considered how the impact of GM crops would be felt 
across five different potential future scenarios. It concluded that: a future either with 
or without GM crops will entail trade-offs between costs in one area and benefits in 
another; any economic benefit of GM crops is likely to be limited in the short-term; 
public and consumer attitudes are of central importance; there is significant potential 
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for benefits from future developments, but current GM crops do not offer significant 
benefits, particularly for consumers; and that international implications could be 
significant to UK and EU decisions. 
As with the Science Review, the responses to the economic study from all sides of 
the debate emphasised the aspects of the costs and benefits report they felt 
supported their particular viewpoint. For environmental NGOs, the report was 
perceived as a step towards the Government ending its commitment to GM crops and 
confirmed their view that there is little economic justification for commercialisation of 
GM crops. Conversely, the Agricultural Biotechnology Council (the abc), an industry 
alliance, stated that they fully agreed with the report that existing commercial GM 
crops would offer ‘cost and convenience advantages to UK farmers when introduced 
commercially’ (abc web site, March 2004). 
Research as part of the learning process 
A general tension exists in the UK between the Government’s desire to encourage 
the development of new technologies for economic and social benefits and their 
desire to maintain consumer choice and public trust. As also noted by Levitt (2003), 
such tensions have led to an evidence-based approach to policy whereby decisions 
can be seen to be based on sound evidence. As noted earlier, in the case of GM 
crops this has generally meant scientific evidence. All policy actors view research as 
a necessary part of precaution. However, for those critical of the introduction of GM 
crops, the evidence provided by the scientific studies remains inadequate. There is 
concern among those outside industry, for example, among organisations such as the 
Five Year Freeze and Genewatch, that not only is there not enough research being 
done, but that there should be more diversity of expertise involved in the research 
and its interpretation. There is concern about the independence and hence the 
trustworthiness of the conclusions, leading some policy actors to insist that more 
independent, public sector, GM crop research is carried out. Research on alternative 
approaches to GM is also considered to be seriously under-funded. Disagreement 
with industry and government scientists over the evidence for the successful use of 
GM crops has led some policy actors to commission their own research, for example 
the Soil Association has drawn on the experiences of North American farmers (Soil 
Association, 2002). However, the way research is used by different policy actors 
within debates is not straightforward. For example, the same research is often being 
used to support opposing arguments (see Section 3.1.1.4).  
As the Government commissions more research, areas for further research are 
highlighted. For example, the Farms Scale Evaluations not only provided information 
on growing HTGM crops but also highlighted broader issues concerning agriculture 
and the environment. Government initiatives to involve the wider community through 
the formal public debate have also highlighted key areas for research, such as the 
balance between public and privately funded research and the need for consideration 
of the wider role of agriculture4. Recently the Environmental Audit Committee noted 
that ‘the government and its advisory bodies are still guilty of setting too low the level 
of harm’ (House of Commons, 2004). NGOs, consumer groups and the organic 
farming lobby are also challenging the Government’s view of harm. Future scientific 
and socio-economic research, informed by the results of the FSEs, the Science 
Review and the economics study, has the potential to enable investigations that 
contribute to a wider view of environmental impacts and a broader view of ‘harm’.  
Research is therefore part of a policy learning process. It is not simply providing 
‘evidence’ but is contributing to a process of learning as policy actors rethink the 
policy problems. Since the establishment of the FSEs, the AEBC, in particular, has 
been instrumental in highlighting gaps in knowledge and failings in research policies, 
which have led to a shift in the Government’s position. Although there are criticisms, 
research agendas have broadened in response to queries from ACRE and the AEBC, 
                                                     
4 The AEBC is to consider the gaps and inconsistencies between research and policy agendas 
in its future work (AEBC, 2004). 
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and in response to questioning from critics. The Government has broadened its view 
of uncertainty as it has gradually accepted that decisions on commercialisation are 
more complex than it originally thought. Thus research is being used to endorse 
different opinions and further fuel debates and as a result, it is contributing to a 
broader view of GM crops. 
Regulatory measures: precaution as assessing and 
managing risks 
The UK Government has stated that it has no fundamental objections to the 
introduction of GM crops provided it meets current regulatory requirements. As noted 
earlier, the Government claims that it is adopting a ‘precautionary approach’ to the 
introduction of GM crops, commenting that the regulatory regime is ‘firmly based on 
the precautionary principle as applied on a strictly case-by case basis’ (DEFRA, 
2004a). This desire to maintain a case-by-case approach, where each application is 
judged on its own merits, is supported by industry. However, the process of 
assessment is not perceived by policy actors as a static, one-off process. As noted by 
the Science Review Panel: 
‘Regulatory evaluation needs to keep pace with the challenges posed by 
developments in this technology and recognise progress in understanding 
and knowledge.’ (GM Science Review Panel, 2003). 
A key criticism of the current regulatory process is that the focus on the risk to health 
and environment takes no account of the broader concerns of many policy actors and 
members of the public. Those critical of GM crops remain sceptical about the capacity 
of the regulatory regime to control the technology. Such scepticism is reinforced by 
incidents such as that in 2002 when GM rape seed containing antibiotic material was 
found in the FSE sites. There remains a lack of trust in the scientific judgements 
being made, and ‘expert’ perceptions are viewed as not being grounded in the real 
world. Further, critics of GM crops point out that risk assessment and management 
do not take account of the fact that the costs and benefits are not the same for 
everyone. 
The point at which precaution is brought into the assessment of a new product is also 
disputed. As noted earlier, industry views precaution as already operating at an early 
stage in the regulatory process, whereas other policy actors consider that it is brought 
into the process too late, for example at the stage of deciding what products to 
develop. Further, the FSEs have highlighted the need for a broader assessment, to 
consider issues surrounding co-existence of different types of agriculture. It has also 
highlighted the need to consider the impacts associated with conventional agriculture, 
particularly to satisfy the needs of those seeking improvements in comparisons 
between GM and non-GM agriculture. 
Broader assessment: precaution and co-existence 
The increasing likelihood of the commercialisation of GM crops in the UK has resulted 
in co-existence and liability becoming central to discussions. The issue of co-
existence of GM and non-GM crops has highlighted not only the conflicting views of 
the organisations representing diverse farming communities within the UK, but also 
the tension between the national position on GM crops and local positions (see 
Section 3.3.1.2). Each devolved administration in the UK – England, Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland – has its own competent authority. Therefore, following the co-
existence amendment to EC Directive 2001/18/EC, each region may introduce its 
own co-existence arrangements. The devolved administrations of Wales and 
Scotland, where not all ministers agree with the national decision on GM crops, have 
been particularly vocal about their concerns. The Scottish Government for example, 
has stated ‘We will rigorously apply the precautionary principle in our approach to GM 
crops’ (AEBC, 2003). A number of counties within England, such as Devon and 
Dorset, are promoting themselves as GM-free areas. An example of the strength of 
feeling comes from Yorkshire Council, where one councillor is attempting to make 
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things difficult for the Government by encouraging people to grow organic maize in 
their gardens and allotments with the aim of forcing the Government to consult with 
each individual (BBC Radio 4, 2004). The National Assembly for Wales (NAW) has 
set its own policy regarding GM crops. It is applying the most restrictive approach 
possible within EU legislation, with the aim of keeping its products distinctive for 
marketing purposes. Although this is a commercial position, environmental arguments 
are used for taking precautionary measures. The Welsh Assembly, in particular, is 
perceived as being instrumental in raising the profile of co-existence issues at EU 
level and putting the issue of the co-existence of GM and non-GM crops firmly on the 
EU agenda (see Section 3.1.3.3). 
In 2003 the AEBC issued a report on co-existence and liability issues (AEBC, 2003). 
Their report focused on the need to maintain consumer choice. The AEBC listed nine 
recommendations (see Section 3.1.3.1) and concluded that if commercialisation goes 
ahead, greater caution should occur in the initial years. While the FSEs highlighted 
concerns over the co-existence of GM and non-GM agriculture, advocates of 
commercialisation are quick to point out the there has been no loss of organic status 
throughout the period of the FSEs. They argue that as co-existence is a farm 
management issue and not an issue related to the genetic modification itself, 
solutions to any difficulties can be found. Thus the FSEs and issues concerning co-
existence have highlighted the importance of farm management practices for GM 
crops. 
A key problem noted in the AEBC report (2003) is that of compliance with any co-
existence protocols where there is no market driver to ensure that a farmer growing 
GM crops will protect their neighbour (see Section 3.1.3.4). Industry cites previous 
experience with a poisonous crop, high erucic acid oilseed rape5, as demonstrating 
that protocols can be made to work. While industry have a preference for a voluntary 
code of practice, the AEBC, whose members cover the range of views on GM crops, 
generally concluded that statutory backing for the key elements of a co-existence 
regime was advisable and was more likely to gain the confidence of the various 
stakeholders. 
It is currently Government policy to increase the market share of organic crops, 
particularly within the regionally-devolved administrations. Increasing organic 
production will place increasing pressure on GM farmers to ensure that organic fields 
remain organic. The most appropriate threshold levels for unavoidable (adventitious) 
presence of GM material in non-GM crops or produce is therefore the subject of much 
controversy (see Section 3.2.2). The leading certification body for UK organic 
production, the Soil Association, have set their own de facto ‘zero’ threshold of 0.1%6, 
i.e. far below the 0.9% required by EU law (AEBC, 2003). Industry considers a 
threshold of 0.1% to be unreasonable and argues that successful co-existence under 
such a low threshold is probably unachievable. While the organic lobby consider a 
low threshold to be essential to meet the demands of its customers, low thresholds 
are perceived by industry as an obstacle deliberately placed in the way of the 
commercialisation of GM crops by the organic lobby. 
There are many unresolved aspects associated with maintaining an effective co-
existence protocol. Questions remain about what farm assurance and stewardship 
scheme should be implemented, how to provide an appropriate land information 
system, who should pay for auditing and monitoring, and who should compensate 
non-GM growers for any resulting economic loss. As the UK has not yet experienced 
growing GM crops on a commercial scale, the likely extent of any problems remains 
unclear. Yet debates concerning co-existence have highlighted potential difficulties 
and unknown consequences not only as a result of planting GM crops, but also with 
modern-day agriculture more generally. 
                                                     
5 For growing high erucic acid oil seed rape (HEAR), maintaining separation distances is 
essential as it must not enter the food chain. Industry protocols for this crop already exist 
(AEBC, 2003). 
6 0.1% is the limit of technical measurability. 
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Expert judgements: precaution as broadening expertise 
and seeking legitimate decisions 
Precaution in the UK has involved a general process of broadening expertise, with 
the Government seeking to be seen to be open and therefore to be making more 
legitimate decisions. Experiments in governance, such as the establishment of the 
AEBC, are leading to increasing openness in expert judgements, and greater input 
into the process by a wider range of stakeholders. The broadening of expertise and 
the inclusion of a diversity of views on precaution and GM crops is an on-going 
process. The expertise changes as the membership of bodies (such as the Advisory 
Committee on Releases to the Environment (ACRE) and the AEBC) change, as their 
sub-groups focus on new issues, as they draft in or take evidence from additional 
experts, and as they interact with one another. 
The UK Government is keen to rebuild public confidence in science through public 
debate. For example, in a speech on science and innovation in 2002 the Prime 
Minister announced that: 
‘We need, (therefore), a robust, engaging dialogue with the public. We 
need to re-establish trust and confidence in the way that science can 
demonstrate new opportunities, and offer new solutions.’ (Prime Minister’s 
Speeches 2002). 
Yet, as noted previously, many of the concerns of those worried about, or opposed to, 
GM crops are not just about the science and safety issues, but about processes such 
as the independence of risk research, the exclusion of socio-economic issues and 
ethics from assessment processes, the threat to farming as a commercial operation, 
the impact of agricultural intensification on biodiversity, and the way that monitoring 
will be carried out. The establishment of the AEBC in 2000 aimed to build greater 
public confidence in the way government dealt with these issues. The AEBC has 
sought ways for such concerns to be more formally elicited, analysed and 
documented. 
Although lacking the statutory authority of ACRE, as a strategic advisory body the 
AEBC has been influential in people’s thinking on issues relating to GM crops. It has 
raised the profile of criticisms of current risk regulation structures and its reports have 
been a catalyst for deeper consideration of GM issues by all stakeholders. Operating 
in a more open way than ACRE, the AEBC has been critical of the lack of 
transparency over how experts make complex social and political judgements. It has 
provided a means for focusing and highlighting current concerns over GM crops and 
a means of legitimising factors other than the science. Further, it has enabled the 
inadequacies of regulation and government communication to be revealed. Of 
particular concern for its members, despite the difficulties involved, has been ways to 
involve all stakeholders’ views and ways of engaging with the public. The broad 
spectrum of views represented by AEBC members has not necessary resulted in a 
consensus on issues, but nevertheless has resulted in reports welcomed by most 
stakeholders. It has been influential on Government thinking and action, particularly 
through its publications. The AEBC has applied pressure on the Government for 
public policies and regulatory frameworks to expose and embrace the different views 
that exist on GM crops and to develop shared understandings (see AEBC, 2001b). 
This pressure led Government to agree to hold a more formal, open, process of 
public debate alongside the science review and the economics study of GM crops. 
‘GM Nation?’ – the formal public debate 
The formal public debate represented a way for Government to meet its aim of 
restoring people’s confidence in science. Anyone was invited to contribute to the 
consultation process through the web site and later through open meetings (see 
Section 3.2.3). The Government commented at the time that ‘The intention is to 
create a dialogue between all strands of opinion on GM issues’ (Government 
response to AEBC, April 2002), indicating its desire to restore people’s confidence in 
processes. 
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‘GM Nation?’, the official ‘public debate’, has been recognised by many stakeholders 
as an innovative endeavour (see for example, Stebbings, 2003). It was an attempt to 
link expert judgements with broader public concerns for GM crops, and provided an 
opportunity for developing mutual learning. While not without criticism (see Section 
3.2.3) and with varying degrees of success, it was also an attempt to create an arena 
in which lay people could participate. The Steering Board made deliberate attempts to 
frame the debate around the real concerns of members of the public and in terms that 
they would understand, rather than those of the ‘experts’. Serious efforts were made 
to provide people with the necessary background material to enable their participation 
and to go beyond consulting those who would normally make contributions. This 
represents a step forward in the conduct of public consultation for policy decision 
making processes in the UK. 
However, ‘GM Nation?’ has done little to bring views closer together. It has also been 
criticised for the way that it was organised and financed. The Select Committee for 
the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, which conducted an inquiry into the conduct 
of the debate, although complementary of many aspects, upheld the industry view 
that the main element of the debate was biased, commenting that: 
‘The debate also did not engage people beyond a self-selecting group 
which already held views about GM. Thus the wider public was in the main 
not informed by the debate, and nor were their opinions canvassed.’ 
(House of Commons, 2003). 
Further, structuring the overall debate in such a way that the Science Review was 
considered entirely separately from the public part of the debate has done little to 
bring non-scientific and scientific concerns together. Throughout ‘GM Nation?’ it 
remained unclear how the ‘public’ views were to be fed into the overall decision about 
commercialisation, leading to further distrust at a time when the Government is keen 
to rebuild trust. Yet ‘GM Nation?’ represents an intentionally more formal approach to 
broadening expertise. 
Thus Government structures are increasingly opening up, both intentionally and 
unintentionally, to wider expertise. As a result of establishing the AEBC and widening 
ACRE’s scientific expertise, the Government has responded to concerns as they 
arise. However, while the Government is attempting to broaden expertise beyond 
official bodies, stakeholders remain critical of the way that expertise is still limited and 
of the quality of expertise for looking at uncertainties. For example, the public 
consultation procedures within the UK’s interpretation of the new Deliberate Release 
Directive have been criticised as inadequate, and the adequacy of the scientific 
evidence and the scientific abilities of ACRE are being questioned, particularly over 
approval for T25 maize (see Section 3.2.1.1). Further, although Government has 
attempted to respond to calls for wider and improved communication and consultation 
processes, there has been little advice as to how to deal with the wealth of 
perspectives, demands and expectations such processes generate. 
Stakeholder roles: precaution as learning and reflecting 
As noted earlier, at the extreme ends of the spectrum of views on GM crops, the 
different perspectives of the policy actors remain highly polarised. At each stage of 
the decision making process concerning the commercialisation of GM crops in the 
UK, the various policy actors have presented versions of the issues, for example, 
through web sites, the media, or at meetings, workshops and public events. They 
have formed alliances to strengthen their positions in the debate and to challenge 
other perspectives. For example, industry established a platform for the views of 
those with positive experiences of GM crops, called the Agriculture and 
Biotechnology Council (abc), which brings together BASF, Bayer Crop Science, Dow 
Agrosciences UK, Dupont, Monsanto UK and Syngenta (see Section 3.3.2). Industry 
is anxious for Government to convey a positive message about GM crops and not to 
allow precaution to be used as a delaying tactic or a means for stifling innovation, as 
noted earlier. Opponents of GMOs have also formed alliances, such as the Five Year 
Freeze Campaign, an alliance of 120 organisations including local authorities and 
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businesses, initiated in 1999 in response to the first GMO imports (see Section 3.3). 
Through the Soil Association, the organic lobby have been particularly vocal in their 
resistance to GM crops. Bodies such as the AEBC play an important role in 
attempting to reconcile these opposing views. 
Thus the ‘precautionary approach’ taken by the UK is not only a dynamic process but 
also a learning process for those involved. Government is learning that the process is 
more important than the science itself, as few people are sufficiently knowledgeable 
to be critical of the detail of the science. Clarity, openness and inclusion are 
considered important characteristics of decision making and are consequently 
aspects which attract criticism and affect trust. The wider range of expertise on official 
bodies is adding legitimacy to official reports and enabling more inclusive and hence 
less contested analysis of situations. 
The formal public debate, in particular, provided an opportunity to engage policy 
actors in a process of reflection. The Government, for example has reflected on the 
lessons it may learn from the public debate (see DEFRA, 2004c). Industry and 
environmental NGOs have continuously been considering their position in the light of 
others. The public has been given an opportunity to comment and reflect on issues in 
a way that goes beyond what has been done before. Web sites, in particular, have 
become an important vehicle for reflection and the promotion of different perspectives 
and differences of opinion. They have offered a means for highlighting new or specific 
issues. The richness of views is contributing to a negotiation over what kind of future 
society would like to see. Further, in highlighting the potential problems with GM 
crops, policy actors have also raised the profile of wider issues, such as those 
associated with conventional agriculture or with the introduction of new technologies 
more generally. 
Communication is therefore an important ongoing process for a precautionary 
approach. As noted earlier, industry is forming alliances and so are NGOs. There is 
greater communication between government advisory committees and between those 
committees, NGOs and the wider public. There is increasing realisation of the need to 
work together to find mutually acceptable outcomes. However, the difficulties 
encountered by the AEBC in its report on co-existence, particularly with obtaining 
agreement among its members on reasonable thresholds and appropriate measures 
for co-existence, demonstrate the limits to achieving agreement by means of greater 
stakeholder involvement (see Section 3.2.2). Further, the form of communication is 
itself a controversial issue among policy actors. For example, the National Consumer 
Council (2002) comments that ‘traditional risk communication typically sees the 
process as an add-on at the end of the risk management process’, exemplified by ‘we 
make the decision and then we tell you what the decision is’. They remain critical of 
‘one way dialogue’ and communication in the form of information provision. 
The deliberate policy to broaden expertise in risk regulation has set in motion a 
process of inclusion of expertise beyond government expectations. It is a process that 
may undermine rather than help to achieve the stated Government aim of restoring 
public confidence in science as the basis for policy making. The inclusion of many 
perspectives means that evidence and processes become more open to diverse 
interpretations. The response to these interpretations is critical for building trust. For 
many stakeholders, the decision-making process means being open to different 
outcomes and reaching decisions which encompass more perspectives. It therefore 
means going beyond the traditional ‘expert’-led models to the introduction of 
technology. Further, if the Government is to succeed in its aim to rebuild trust, a wider 
range of concerns than those dealt with by the current regulation process would need 
to be adequately addressed. 
New approaches to the policy process are providing new opportunities for learning. 
However, the opening up of government processes has yet to result in calming 
objections to the commercialisation of GM crops or criticisms surrounding scientific 
expertise. Further, Government experiments with new national structures do not 
necessarily mean it is adequately addressing local concerns. The promotion of more 
open processes within national government and inclusion of wider expertise and 
hence broader concerns is highlighting the way that the UK is restricted by the 
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requirements of EU directives. The ability of the UK Government to respond to wider 
needs is constrained by the emphasis placed on science-based regulation at the 
European level. Nonetheless, events in the UK are contributing to a wider learning 
process at this level. For example, data from the Farm Scale Evaluations on 
biodiversity and reports from the public debate are providing information that may be 
relevant to other countries in Europe. The period following the voluntary agreement 
with industry over commercialisation has therefore been used constructively by the 
UK to further develop a ‘precautionary approach’ that is closely observed by other 
member states. 
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1 Introduction 
Accounts of precaution and precautionary practices for GM crops in the UK are set 
against the backdrop of current debate concerning potential commercialisation of GM 
herbicide tolerant crops. Commercialisation of GM crops is further set within the wider 
context of changes in UK agricultural policy. Environmental degradation is receiving 
greater attention resulting to a shift in agricultural policy towards requirements for 
improving environmental protection. This process is part of a more general shift in 
policy at European level, as demonstrated by recent changes to the European 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), whereby farmers receiving financial support will 
find it necessary to meet environmental, food safety and animal welfare standards in 
order to receive financial support. Biotechnology is viewed in the UK as a way of 
increasing agricultural efficiency and attracting investment to create a more 
competitive industry. However, there is concern that its implementation may be in 
conflict with measures, such as the UK Biodiversity Action Plan (Department of 
Environment, 1994), that are designed to protect the environment. 
When GM crops were proposed for commercialisation, issues concerning their impact 
on biodiversity came to the fore. In October 1998 the Government announced its 
intention for a ‘managed development’ of GM crops and a major obstacle to 
commercialisation was the controversy over the possibility that broad-spectrum 
herbicides may be harmful to wildlife habitats. In the UK 69% of the land is registered 
as agricultural holdings (Countryside Agency, 2002) and there are few remaining 
‘wild’ areas. The wildlife habitats within the farmland are of particular importance both 
for their contribution to biodiversity and as part of our cultural landscape heritage. 
In response to these environmental concerns, in 1999 the expertise within the 
scientific advisory body on releases to the environment, ACRE, was broadened to 
include agro-ecological expertise and members with direct links to the biotechnology 
industry were not reappointed. The Farm Scale Evaluation research programme was 
established and Industry agreed to wait until the results were known before 
attempting to commercialise the crops. However, as a precautionary measure the 
Farm Scale Evaluations (FSEs) have been controversial. Rather than settle these 
environmental matters, as originally intended, they have intensified debate by 
providing a focus for people’s concerns. 
Although the regulatory authorities and industry have remained convinced of the 
safety of GM crops as regards human health and are convinced of their benefits, 
others are not. In addition to fears about the environment, those critical of GM crops 
have expressed wider concerns over issues such as the economic effects and their 
social and ethical implications. In response to concerns that issues beyond the 
science should be addressed, in 2000 the Government set up the Agriculture and 
Biotechnology Commission. The AEBC has been influential in making apparent 
peoples concerns and the limitations of a narrow scientific risk assessment. In a key 
report on the Farm Scale Evaluations, ‘Crops on Trial’ (AEBC, 2001b), the AEBC 
highlighted the way that a more participatory approach would draw to the 
Governments attention the importance of issues of concern, such as the adequacy of 
the risk assessment procedures, separation distances and the need to protect the 
interests of organic farmers, and provide greater understanding. Acting on advice 
from the AEBC, in 2002 the Government commissioned a formal public debate on 
GM crops. 
Under pressure from environmental NGOs and following advisory body advice, 
biotechnology regulation in the UK has involved a general process of broadening 
expertise. Concern over GM crops has led to strategies for precautionary 
commercialisation (see Levidow & Carr, 2000) with the Government seeking to be 
seen to be open, considering more uncertainties and therefore making more 
legitimate decisions. 
Currently the Government remains committed to the Bioscience industries and new 
innovations as a way of maintaining the nation’s wealth. The science base is viewed 
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as vital for building a knowledge driven economy (BIGT, 2003) and for providing the 
evidence for evidence-based policy making (Levitt, 2003). Further, following 
controversies in the agricultural sector over BSE and Foot and Mouth disease, the 
Government has been keen to be seen to be more open and transparent, making 
legitimate discussions and providing ‘balanced’ regulation. Considering all this 
evidence and following the advice from ACRE, on the 9th March 2004 the 
Government outlined its ‘precautionary approach’ to GM crops. One crop involved in 
the Farm Scale Evaluations, GMHT maize, was given the go-ahead for 
commercialisation, subject to certain conditions. 
This report considers the recent ‘precautionary approach’ to commercialisation of GM 
crops adopted by the UK. Drawing on information gathered from documents released 
by the relevant policy actors, face to face interviews, telephone 
conversations/interviews with a range of representatives from Government, farmers 
groups and environmental non-government organisations (NGOs) (see Section 4), 
the report considers how precaution and precautionary practices are framed. Section 
2 of the report considers how the precautionary principle is cited or used in practice 
by different policy actors. Section 3 provides more detail on precautionary 
approaches under three institutional practices – regulatory measures, expert 
judgements and stakeholder roles. 
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2 Precaution: use of the precautionary 
principle 
Although the precautionary principle is widely used at both the national and 
international level, as noted by the Food Ethics Council (2003), it is only loosely 
defined in policy. The EC Communication on the precautionary principle (EC, 2000), 
setting out guidelines for the use of the precautionary principle, comments that they 
are only intended ‘to serve as general guidance’. Interviewees from all stakeholder 
groups for this project (see Annex II) felt that the Commissions document was useful, 
but there was general concern over its use as a practical tool. As one interviewee 
commented: 
‘I think it is a useful document, but I have to say I don’t know much about it 
compared to other legislation, but it does seem to be quite a useful tool’… 
‘Speaking personally, as I was saying before, the precautionary principle is 
almost a theory or a mechanism of regulation or governance that almost 
seems to be one step removed from the kind of things that a person might 
be doing in their every day lives’. 
In the UK there is general awareness among policy actors of the precautionary 
principle, however, there is no agreement on what it means or how it should be 
implemented. The people interviewed for this project generally felt it was important to 
debate the meaning of the principle, and some organisations have been working to 
produce their own interpretations of its meaning. 
A series of seminars with NGOs, business and Government on the precautionary 
principle in practice (see Willis and Oldham, 2002) also concluded that although the 
precautionary principle generally is used to justify or criticise decisions of scientific 
uncertainty ‘there is no clear agreement on what it means in practice’. However, 
within the differing views the seminars found a clear consensus emerging between 
business, NGOs and Government as to the essential elements of precaution (see 
Table 2). 
Table 2 Consensus among NGOs, business and Government about 
how a precautionary process should work (from Willis & Oldham, 2002) 
· Precaution is part of, not instead of, good science. 
· Continuing scientific monitoring and research is essential. 
· Tools such as risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis should be used in 
context. 
· There is a need for genuine stakeholder and public involvement. 
· Openness and transparency is central. 
· A precautionary decision-making process will not necessarily result in a ban 
– there is a range of possible outcomes 
The following sections consider different policy actors’ views on the use of the 
precautionary principle both generally and in relation to GM crops. 
2.1 Government and the precautionary principle 
The Government’s Sustainable Development White paper sets out their commitment 
to the precautionary principle as set out in the 1992 Rio Declaration. While there are 
no Government plans to issue any guidelines on the EC Communication on the 
precautionary principle (DEFRA interview), guidelines have been produced for use by 
government departments on the use of the principle within its own departments. 
Elaborating on the guidelines set out in the EC communication, the Inter-
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Departmental Liaison Group on Risk Assessment (ILGRA) who advises Government 
on risk policy have issued guidelines in an attempt to gain a consistent approach 
within government departments (ILGRA, 2002). The guidelines recognise that there 
may be different strengths of precaution (see Table 3). 
Table 3 Contrasting views of precaution (source: ILGRA, 2002) 
‘Weak’ precaution ‘Moderate’ precaution ‘Strong’ precaution 
Presumption of 
unfettered market-led 
development and 
technological 
innovation. 
Underlying presumption of 
unfettered market-led 
development and 
technological innovation, 
but recognition that this 
can sometimes be 
overthrown where there 
are high levels of societal 
concern.  
No presumption of either 
market led or technologically 
driven development.  
Regulators intervene 
only where there is 
positive scientific 
evidence of risk and 
intervention 
demonstrably cost-
effective.  
Presumption of 
intervention as under 
‘weak’, but case by case 
flexibility to shift the onus 
of proof towards the risk 
creator.  
Risk creator demonstrates 
safety of activity. Little 
credence in cost 
effectiveness.  
Presumption of risk 
management. 
Banning very rare. 
Underlying presumption of 
risk management. 
Banning possible, but a 
last resort. 
Presumption of risk 
avoidance. Banning likely.  
Presumption of free 
trade on the basis of 
objective scientific 
criteria. 
Individual preferences 
and societal concerns 
given no weight. 
Underlying presumption of 
free trade on the basis of 
scientific criteria. 
Recognition that individual 
preferences and societal 
concerns matter. 
No automatic presumption of 
free trade. 
Individual preferences and 
societal concerns dominant. 
ILGRA make a distinction between the precautionary principle and other drivers for 
caution. The precautionary principle is perceived as being narrower, more specified, 
than ‘being cautionary’. Being cautionary may apply even when there is little scientific 
uncertainty but the nature of the hazard, or those affected, reduces society’s 
tolerance to risk, or when there is a desire to overestimate the risk, for example, over-
engineering of bridges. 
With respect to GM crops, ACRE, the scientific body in the UK responsible for 
advising Government on the risks to health and the environment of the release and 
marketing of GMOs, are assumed to take the precautionary principle into account in 
their decisions and are not given any formal guidance on it. They are considered an 
independent body to the Government and it therefore does not seek to influence 
them, although they are provided with risk assessment guidelines, which may need 
updating in the future. 
The Governments approach to the use of the precautionary principle is not without 
criticism. Some Government advisors have been critical of the way that the principle 
as set out in the EC Communication is frequently forgotten, not understood and 
neglected by people. As one scientist interviewed commented: 
‘the term ‘the precautionary principle’ has become devalued by being 
redefined each time it is used by a different group for their own purposes’. 
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For him the precautionary principle is a clearly developed methodology which is not 
being used by ACRE in any rigorous way. He comments that NGOs have never 
bothered to understand or use it while industry talks about it but does not know what 
it means. Some of the blame is believed to lie with the EC who having worked hard to 
develop the precautionary principle Communication, then did not bother to promote it. 
However, for the Government, who maintain that they are neither for nor against the 
introduction of GM crops in general, the commissioning of large scale farm scale 
evaluations, measures such as thoroughly reviewing the scientific evidence and costs 
and benefits and funding a national formal public debate, are consider to represent a 
‘scale of precaution we don’t apply to anything else’ (M. Beckett Hansard 23 October 
2003). 
2.2 The precautionary principle beyond Government 
Many of the precautionary concerns of those worried about or opposed to GMOs are 
not just about the science and safety issues, but concern processes, such as the 
independence of risk research, the lack of inclusion of the socio-economic issues or 
ethics in the assessment process, the threat to farming as a business, the impact of 
agricultural intensification (changing farming practices as well as crop traits) on 
biodiversity, and the way that monitoring will be implemented. This section considers 
the concerns of industry, farmers’ organisations and environmental NGOs. 
2.2.1 Industry and the precautionary principle 
Generally, Industry has developed its own precautionary approaches, either in the 
form of set guidelines or codes of conduct (e.g. Federation of the Electronics 
Industry’s Ten Commitments drawn up in response to uncertainties over mobile 
phones), or as a necessary part of the process of product research and development. 
Industry representatives argue that an adequate risk assessment and management 
procedure means that there is no need for further actions based on the precautionary 
principle. Although generally supportive of the principle, industry is concerned that a 
lack of clear criteria for its use can lead to abuse and hinder innovation. They argue 
that political and emotional factors are favoured above scientific considerations. The 
European Crop Protection Association, for example, takes the view that ‘Improper 
use of the precautionary principle can lead to a hindering of scientific and 
technological progress’ (ECPA, undated). This is also the view of the UK Crop 
Protection Association who call for accepted guidelines and consensus on 
interpretation of the precautionary principle. 
For industry, precaution is considered to occur at all stages of product research and 
development. Industry representatives argue that they would not wish to promote a 
product that would be unacceptable to the market and that many products do not 
make it though the first 2-3 years of a typical 10 year development period. While 
interviewees felt that industry is aware of the EC document on the precautionary 
principle they did not think that generally it was actively discussed in the context of 
GM crops. At the regulatory level, the regulatory authorities are relied on to consider 
the principle. One interviewee commented that ‘if more information is required by the 
regulators then that is provided’. He also pointed out the way that industry has been 
actively involved in strengthening the requirements of the regulatory system, for 
example in the case of pesticides. 
Industry representatives consider that there is no significant evidence of harmful 
effects due to commercialisation of GM crops in other countries and that they may 
even be safer than conventional crops, (see for example, House of Commons 2002b, 
Annex). Measures such as the FSEs, where the technology has been put before the 
scrutiny of independent scientists, are felt to demonstrate a commitment to openness 
and to basing decisions on the best available scientific evidence. They have criticised 
arguments of those against the commercialisation of GM crops in the UK. The 
organic farming lobby are accused of inflicting their ideological position on other 
farmers for their own commercial advantage and deliberately employing strategies to 
delay planting. Issues such as public acceptability are considered to be part of the 
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market place and not the responsibility of regulation. Whereas the Soil Association, 
consumer organisations and other NGOs are concerned that an assessment process 
should weigh up the costs and benefits to consumers, industry does not see this as 
the role of regulation. For example, one industry representative commented: 
‘I think it is not the role of regulation to determine whether or not there are 
tangible consumer benefits but to establish whether they’re safe and 
whether a clear choice can be provided…’. (D. Pearsall, Q73, House of 
Commons 2002a). 
Industry representatives acknowledge that there are currently no obvious direct 
benefits to consumers of GM crops, but point to future potential benefits, such as bio-
fuels and specialist oils, and to their ability to help farmers compete in the market 
place (abc, 2003a). 
2.2.2 Farmers’ organisations and the precautionary principle 
For farmer organisations, there are issues of responsibility towards, different types of 
farmers and to their customers. The diversity of the farming sector is reflected in the 
large differences between the different farming organisations in the UK regarding GM 
crops. Organisations representing farmers have been perceived as being highly 
polarised (FARM, 2003). Adequately representing a wide diversity of farmers 
interests and hence diversity of views on GM crops, is noted by the National Farmers 
Union as a particular problem (interview). The National Farmers Union (NFU) has a 
position within SCIMAC, an umbrella organisation for the farm supply chain set up to 
support the introduction of GM crops, and is largely in favour of commercialisation of 
GM crops. By contrast, organisations such as the Small Farms Association – 
representing small farmers, the Welsh Farmers Union, and the Soil Association – 
representing the organic producers, are against commercialisation. 
The NFU interviewee advocated a consistent approach to precaution, commenting 
that it would be useful to have a ‘set of principles that you can tick boxes’. For them a 
key part of taking precautionary measures is the need for more research, to fill in 
gaps in present knowledge, although how much evidence would be enough would 
depend on the individual circumstances. Important uncertainties for farmers do not 
just concern the science, but also uncertainties over public acceptability and over 
potential restrictions in farming practices. Of particular concern is the co-existence of 
different types of agriculture and who accepts responsibility when things go wrong. As 
noted by one member of FARM, a campaigning organisation for the interests of 
independent and family farmers: 
‘When the Biotech companies are prepared to accept UNLIMITED liability, 
on a corporate and personal scale, for the consequences of letting GM 
loose, their supposed advantages can be considered. Until then, no 
thanks’. (http://www.farm.org.uk) 
For the Soil Association, as GM and non-GM crops are simply incompatible, 
precaution should not be an issue. They comment that the Government is ahead of 
itself and ‘has taken the final step before it has taken the first step.’ (P. Holden, Q56, 
House of Commons, 2002a). The Soil Associations objections are similar to those of 
other environmental NGOs. They are to do with ‘the risks and dangers of unforeseen 
consequences both to the environment and to human health, the denial of choice and 
the incompatibility of genetic engineering with what we see to be the principles of 
sustainable agriculture.’ (P. Holden, Q7, House of Commons 2002a). Like many 
environmental NGOs, the Soil Association are concerned that while it is important not 
to reject an evidence or science based approach, it should be combined with non-
evidence-based criteria. They point to the absence of evidence, rather than evidence 
of absence of risk, and highlight the importance of intuition in decision making. They 
comment that while it may not be possible yet to measure intuition objectively, ‘many 
hypothesis which were tested by scientists whose names went down in history later, 
probably will be ascribed to intuitive feelings.’ (P. Holden, Q12, House of Commons 
2002a). Although the implications for organic farmers maintain a high profile through 
the Soil Association, the implications of GM crops for conventional farming systems 
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are also a concern for those farmers with an interest in environmental conservation 
practices. 
2.2.3 NGOs and the precautionary principle 
For environmental NGOs the precautionary principle is not just viewed as one 
principle that has to be applied, but as a framework for being precautionary. The 
important thing for them is how it is put into practice. Green Alliance (Willis and 
Oldham, 2002) considers three types of precaution: 1) The precautionary principle as 
defined in the Rio Declaration; 2) A precautionary approach, referring to 
precautionary action taken as a response to scientific uncertainty; 3) A precautionary 
process, which is a practical framework for precautionary actions by establishing 
criteria for decision-making. Others take the view that this is really just semantics. 
Generally precaution is viewed as a process rather than a rigid set of rules to be 
followed, and criticisms of precaution in GM issues are concerned with the processes 
involved in carrying out risk research, assessment and management. Aspects such 
as openness, transparency, stakeholder involvement and dialogue are all important 
aspects of precaution in practice. 
The Consumers’ Association are concerned about the need to put health and 
consumer interests first (Consumers’ Association, 2002). Reports by both the 
Consumers’ Association and the Green Alliance emphasise the need for openness 
and inclusiveness, however, the Consumers’ Association consider what constitutes 
taking a precautionary approach rather than a process and focus on the point at 
which precautionary action should be taken. They argue that it is ‘essential that 
precaution is integral to the entire risk analysis process including the way that risks 
are assessed and the way that risks are communicated’ (Consumers’ Association, 
2002). 
A precautionary approach is about:- 
• Exposing uncertainties; 
• Shifting the focus to what we don’t know; 
• Making any assumptions or judgements explicit; 
• Ensuring that all of the possible options have been considered; 
• Being inclusive; 
• Taking a long-term rather than short-term approach; and Ensuring measures 
are proportionate. 
(Consumers Association, 2002) 
Green Alliance suggest that one way of applying the precautionary principle in 
practice is to embed the principle in guidelines such as codes of conduct and 
government guidance to help to build a ‘library’ of uses. In this way the principle could 
become a basis for legal action through judicial review or corporate liability (Willis and 
Oldham, 2002). They also suggest the term ‘reasonable action’ as a more useful 
concept than ‘proportionality’, because quantifying risk is impossible in cases of 
scientific uncertainty. 
The environmental NGOs interviewed felt it was important that the EU’s 
communication acknowledged socio-economic impacts and non-economic 
considerations as relevant, and also the need for transparency and dialogue with all 
stakeholders. Applying precaution to GM crops means addressing the serious 
omissions in the regulatory process before commercialisation should be considered. 
For some organisations, for example, the Food Ethics Council, the precautionary 
principle represents an opportunity to re-consider the foundations on which the 
current regulatory regime is based: 
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‘The precautionary principle highlights the ethical requirement for a radical 
rethink of regulation and a moratorium on GM crops should remain in 
place pending the completion of this process. Truly precautionary 
regulation must take the assessment of risk ‘acceptability’ as seriously as 
evaluation of the level of risk’. (Food Ethics Council, 2003) 
A comparative approach is advocated by NGOs, where the alternatives are weighed 
up, particularly between GM and non-GM options, and the uncertainties in the 
science are taken into consideration. It is felt that a broader range of people should 
be brought into the risk assessment process and that a more holistic approach was 
necessary. As commented by one NGO director: 
‘the precautionary principle should be referred to at all stages, ranging 
from potential damage caused to natural organisms to ecosystem 
disturbance, it includes wild plants and organisms, the effects on genetic 
diversity, species integrity and concern for future generations’. 
For organisations subscribing to the Five Year Freeze, who aim to maintain the 
moratorium on the commercialisation of GM crops (see Section 3.3), GMOs possess 
potential risks and no real benefits and therefore we ‘should proceed on the basis of 
precaution’. They argue that ‘the Government has done very little to take a 
precautionary approach’ (Five Year Freeze, 2001) as they have not refused or 
suspended any marketing consents despite concerns. A precautionary approach 
would mean taking a number of actions such as the withdrawal of marketing consents 
for all GM foods until there has been a review of their safety; ending of the use of 
substantial equivalence for testing GM safety; introducing a monitoring scheme that 
determines short and long-term effects of eating GM foods; introducing safety 
regulations for GM animal feed and assessing secondary effects e.g. herbicide 
residues present in GM plants. 
While industry puts faith in the Government to apply the precautionary principle in the 
regulatory process, NGOs are critical of what they perceive as ‘expert’ led, top-down 
approaches to risk management, and the lack of recognition of broader societal 
concerns. ‘Experts’ are viewed as being insulated from the risks. Communication is 
therefore an important part of a precautionary process for this group, who feel that it 
is not taken seriously by Government. This was noted by the National Consumer 
Council (2002) who commented that ‘traditional risk communication typically sees the 
process as an add-on at the end of the risk management process’, exemplified by ‘we 
make the decision and then we tell you what the decision is’. They are critical of the 
‘one way dialogue’ – that communication is frequently in the form of information 
provision. 
2.3 Emerging perspectives on precaution for GM crops 
There are many of perspectives on GM crops in the UK covering the whole spectrum 
of views. At one end are those who perceive GM crops as merely an extension of an 
already highly developed seed technology. Therefore, it is of no more concern than 
conventional seed technology which is already highly developed. They point to the 
benefits that GM crops can provide both for the environment and for food security. 
Potential problems with GM crops are considered in the context of problems already 
experienced with ‘conventional crops’ and the threats to biodiversity are considered in 
contrast with threats from other sources, for example, from non-native invasive 
species. At the other end of the range of perspectives are those who view genetic 
modification as a large step in intervention. They point to the uncertainties and 
limitations of current knowledge, even with conventional agriculture. They believe that 
the risks are at present too great to allow commercialisation to proceed, although 
many do not rule out their future use. These different perspectives on GM crops offer 
a multidimensional view and serve a valuable purpose in the negotiation over the 
path that society should take, and a way to explore different options. 
Clear themes emerge across different groups when people are considering 
precaution, whether this is concerning GM crops or precaution in the face of scientific 
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uncertainly generally (see Table 4). They highlight the way that precaution in the UK 
is operating as a process rather than as a set procedure. 
Table 4 Emerging perspectives on precaution and GM crops 
Emerging perspectives – 
key themes 
Examples from documents and interview material 
Precaution as proceeding 
with care 
Precaution is something people do anyway, that they exercise all the 
time. Industry does it already with new products. 
Precaution is about ‘proceed with great care’ – the precautionary 
principle is exercised all the time in areas where there is incomplete 
knowledge.  
Precaution as good 
science 
It is a necessary part of good scientific practice. 
Precaution as a rational 
approach/framework for 
decision making 
Implementing the precautionary principle should not be based on 
emotions. 
Some stakeholders are particularly keen that a greater following for 
the EC’s communication on the precautionary principle will lead to a 
more rational approach to decision making. 
Arguments against irrational precaution refer to the way no harm has 
happened yet – no detrimental health effects, no contamination of 
organic agriculture during field trials. 
Precaution as a means 
for greater openness 
Transparency is particularly important for NGOs and farmer groups. 
For example, calls for results of any monitoring programme to be in 
the public domain. 
The AEBC is a good example of attempts at openness in 
Government advisory committees. 
Precaution as a 
mechanism for placing 
policy decisions within a 
societal context 
We should question the need for the technology in the first place. 
It should also mean the inclusion of an evaluation of all possible 
options. 
Precaution should involve widening decisions beyond a narrow 
scientific base. 
Precaution as a pretext The public debate will be indecisive, Government will use it to back 
their decision either way. 
Precaution as inclusive Precaution means including more views. 
The public debate is viewed as playing an important role in opening 
up the debate. 
Precaution as fair The costs and benefits of GM crops are not necessarily evenly 
distributed. 
NGOs call for consideration of this in the assessment process. 
Precaution as a means 
for stifling innovation 
Concern that the precautionary principle will be used to prevent 
technological developments. 
Commercialisation of GM crops will go ahead, it is just a question of 
time. The precautionary principle should not be invoked to slow 
development down. 
Precaution as a delaying 
tactic 
Precaution is viewed as slowing things down, to delay the decision–
making process for as long as possible. 
Given time the public will change their views and this will be reflected 
in Government decisions. 
Precaution as an iterative 
and flexible process 
Moving with the situations as they change, as the technology 
develops. Precautionary measures need to be flexible, they need to 
be appropriate to the different products and contexts. 
Precaution as a 
reputation enhancer/as 
demonstrating 
responsibility 
Business may utilise precaution to demonstrate their ability to be 
responsible. There is a growing realisation that it is an essential 
element in the corporate environment. 
Growing concern over the way that NGOs/media conduct themselves 
in GM debates – calls for greater responsibility. 
Precaution as a long term 
view 
Provides an opportunity to consider the future – should be a long 
term rather than a short term view. 
Precaution as irrelevant No commercialisation of GM crops would mean there is no need for 
precaution. 
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2.4 The precautionary principle as a tool or mindset, 
toolkit and/or process 
Both a ‘toolkit and process approach to precaution operates in the UK. A ‘toolkit 
approach i.e. as a set of rules to be applied, has attractions for those who are 
engaged in the practical implementation of the precautionary principle. Although 
some organisations have used the EU guidelines to develop a precautionary 
approach relevant to their own particular needs, the precautionary principle is not 
necessarily articulated as such, but is more an underlying feature of people’s 
perspectives. It was generally considered, by people interviewed for this project, to 
operate at all levels and across time. They rarely use the word uncertainty in the 
narrow way it is used in the EU document and consider precaution as more a general 
way of acting rather than something to be triggered. Thus while Government and 
industry may prefer a ‘toolkit’ approach to the precautionary principle, it is more often 
a context or mindset for making decisions. A tension therefore exists between the 
need for more formal, stable approaches to precaution, as set out in the European 
Commission’s Communication (EC, 2000), and a more open process, i.e. between 
something which is triggered and something which is a more general way of acting. 
Precaution for GM crops in the UK is an ongoing process, drawing in more expertise, 
both strategically and unintentionally, and creating new institutional practices. The 
following sections consider this process in detail, commenting on developments in the 
UK under three institutional practices – regulatory measures, expert judgements and 
stakeholder roles. 
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3 Three institutional practices 
In a statement on Government policy on GM crops (DEFRA 2004a), Margaret Beckett 
the Secretary of State for the Environment and Rural affairs, announced its 
‘precautionary approach’ commenting that: 
‘I believe the approach I have outlined today is the right one. It is 
precautionary. It is evidence-based. In practice it means licensing one 
application, which runs till October 2006, and is subject to two further 
conditions’. 
She added that she had examined all the concerns raised about the 
commercialisation of GM crops, and the UK should oppose EU approval of 
commercial cultivation of HTGM beet and oilseed rape, using the regime as tested in 
the FSEs, anywhere in the European Union. However, she agreed in principle to the 
commercial cultivation of GMHT maize, subject to GMHT maize only being grown as 
in the Farm Scale Evaluations (FSEs) or under conditions that will not result in 
adverse effects to the environment. In response to the concerns over the phasing out 
of the herbicide atrazine, consent holders would also be required to carry out further 
scientific analysis to monitor changes in herbicide use on conventional maize and 
submit new evidence if renewing their existing marketing consent which expires in 
2006. Margaret Beckett noted that FSEs and other research carried out into issues 
concerning GM crops raised far reaching questions for crop management and the 
environment. 
While industry representatives have welcomed the Government’s decision as a step 
forward, they remain concerned that the decision is very cautious. Environmental 
NGOs accuse the Government of failing to listen to the views of consumers and point 
out that the risks outweigh the benefits. The director of Friends of the Earth, for 
example commented: 
‘The government has given the thumbs up to GM maize, and shown two 
fingers to the British public. In demonstrating its pro-GM credentials, the 
government has ignored considerable scientific uncertainties, show 
contempt for parliament and utterly disregarded public opinion’. 
Bayer CropScience has since announced that it will ‘discontinue further efforts to 
commercialise GM forage Maize in the UK (Bayer news release, 31 March 2003). 
The Government placed a number of constraints on this approval before the 
commercial cultivation of GM forage Maize can proceed, thus provoking the company 
to announce that: 
‘The specific details (of the conditions) are still not available and thus will 
result in yet another ‘open-ended’ period of delay. These uncertainties and 
undefined timelines will make this five-year old variety economically non-
viable’. 
The following sections consider the different perspectives in the UK on GM crops and 
events that led up to this decision. The UK’s ‘precautionary approach’ is considered 
under three institutional practices – research, expert judgements and stakeholder 
roles. 
3.1 Regulatory measures 
3.1.1 Research 
In line with a wider move towards more evidence-based approaches to policy 
decisions in the UK, the Government has been keen to ground any decision on GM 
crops firmly in evidence, particularly scientific evidence. Annex III lists some of the 
recent scientific research. The most significant scientific research study undertaken 
has been the Farm Scale Evaluations. A review of the science for GM crops and an 
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analysis of their costs and benefits have also been carried out. These are discussed 
in the following sections. 
3.1.1.1 The Farm Scale Evaluations of GM crops 
The Farm Scale Evaluations (FSEs) research programme began in 1999. As 
previously noted, it followed debate concerning whether GM crops tolerant to broad-
spectrum herbicides would lead to increased weed control and therefore less 
resources for farmland wildlife to feed on. The evaluations investigated how growing 
genetically modified crops might affect the abundance and diversity of farmland 
wildlife as compared with conventional varieties. They represented the world’s largest 
GM crop field trials (Burke, 2003). ACRE also identified the possibility, although still 
considered unlikely, that gene flow may confer an ecological advantage to plants 
outside the agricultural environment. Thus gene flow studies were also included 
alongside the FSEs. At the time, agreement with the farming and industry group 
SCIMAC was reached that no commercial cultivation of GM crops would take place 
until the end of the FSEs (DEFRA 2002a). The FSEs were originally intended to settle 
matters regarding biodiversity issues and GM crops, and so enable commercialisation 
of GM crops to go ahead. However, following their commencement they became the 
subject of controversy and were clearly not able to provide the only basis on which 
Government could make a decision. 
The FSEs lasted for 4 years and cost around £5 million. They were run by a Scientific 
Steering Committee of independent researchers and conservation representatives. A 
total of 273 fields in England, Scotland and Wales were involved, planted with maize, 
beet and oilseed rape (spring and autumn sown). A GM maize (T25) already had a 
1998 marketing consent under Part C of the European Directive and beet and oilseed 
rape have pending applications for Part C and were being grown under research 
consents. The last harvest was in 2003. The results of the research have been 
published although the report for a fourth crop, winter sown oilseed rape, which is the 
crop most commonly grown in the UK, are not expected until later in 2004 (House of 
Commons, 2004). 
The results of the FSEs indicated that following herbicide applications to GMHT ‘beet 
and spring oilseed rape crops, weed biomass and seed rain were one third or less 
than corresponding amounts in conventional crops, resulting in smaller seed banks.’ 
For maize, biomass and seed rain of dicot weeds were higher for the GMHT crops, 
with little evidence of effect on the seed banks (Firbank et al., 2003, The Royal 
Society, 2003). The researchers concluded that growing GMHT beet and spring rape 
on a large-scale may therefore disadvantage wildlife and exacerbate the long-term 
declines of flowering arable weeds. Growing GMHT maize may benefit farmland 
birds. The researchers note that generally the results emphasise the importance of 
farm management practices, as the extent of the effects found would be dependent 
on how yearly crop rotations were managed (Burke, 2003). 
In November 2003, the wider scientific community and others interested were given 
the opportunity to comment on the results as part of the debate on commercialisation. 
ACRE then advised Ministers of the scientific significance of the results. They agreed 
with the FSE researchers and reported that growing GMHT maize would not result in 
adverse effects, while beet and oilseed rape would result in adverse effects 
compared to conventional crops (ACRE, 2004). However, they emphasised that 
these results are only applicable when crops are grown under the same management 
regime as in the FSEs. In light of the phasing out of the use of atrazine, ACRE 
advised that further studies be initiated immediately for GMHT maize and the 
introduction of new weed management regimes for non-GM maize. The House of 
Commons Environmental Audit Committee, which is made up of members of all 
political parties, has also recommended further trials for maize. The Committee 
questioned the validity of the FSEs results for maize because of the use of atrazine, 
and recommended that commercial planting did not occur until the crop had been re-
trialled. They further noted the indecisive nature of both the FSEs and ACREs advice, 
commenting: 
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‘the advice from ACRE is clear but it is not decisive. We acknowledge that 
in its limited scope and contingent nature, the ACRE advice accurately 
reflects the trials themselves’. (House of Commons, 2004). 
The FSEs as a precautionary measure 
For some of the interviewees for this project, the Farm Scale Evaluations (FSEs) 
represent a good example of the precautionary principle in action, with the 
Government carrying out what is required to ensure that it is able to defend its 
position in the European Union. The National Farmers Union have been supportive of 
the evaluations and are a member of SCIMAC, a joint farmer and industry initiative 
that have developed management protocols for the FSEs. However, the NFU 
cautioned that farmers may not choose to grow GM crops, particularly if there were 
no consumer demand (NFU 2003a). For industry the FSE results were considered to 
‘confirm what industry has long argued’ (abc 2003c). The chair of the industry alliance 
the abc, commented that: 
‘Activist groups claim that GM crops were in effect ‘green concrete’ and 
would ‘wipe out’ wildlife. These studies show that this sort of 
scaremongering is not supported by the evidence. On the contrary – this 
evidence show that GM crops are more flexible and can enhance 
biodiversity’. (abc 2003c) 
Others welcome such precautionary efforts, for example, Friends of the Earth 
comment that: 
‘Changes to biodiversity may be serious and possibly irreversible and so 
fall within the scope of precautionary action’. (FOE, 2003) 
However, they are also vocal in their criticisms of the FSEs. Michael Meacher MP, the 
former Environment Minister, has been particularly out-spoken in his criticisms 
commenting that: 
‘the trials were artificial and manipulated to bring about a desired 
outcome’. (Red Pepper, Dec. 2003) 
Mr Meacher pointed out that the use of the subsequently banned chemical atrazine in 
the maize experiments meant that these results are no longer valid. He further 
commented that the management practices of the farmers did not mimic what would 
occur in real life, for example, farmers were advised to carry out only one spraying of 
herbicide allowing weeds to grow again, whereas he considered that in real life they 
would spray more often. 
Critics have been concerned that the results provide only limited data and not a 
definitive risk assessment. Throughout the FSEs they have commented on the lack of 
investigations into the impact on soil, earthworms, fungi and bacteria; that no baseline 
studies for biodiversity exist so changes in species diversity cannot be examined; that 
long-term effects cannot be considered; that separation distances are inadequate to 
avoid cross-contamination of organic and non-organic, and that there is a lack of 
consultation with neighbouring farmers or beekeepers. They have also raised 
questions over the scientific methods used, such as the indicators for biodiversity. 
Friends of the Earth have been particularly concerned over the ability of the FSEs to 
detect ecologically important differences and the relevance of the results once the 
number of farms is scaled up (FOE, 2003). 
Following the FSE results peoples concerns were discussed at special ACRE 
meetings. Concerns raised in peoples submissions to ACRE included: 
Crop yields were not reported in the FSE results, which could lead to underestimates 
of the impacts of management practices if yields of the GM crops were not as 
high as non-GM crops. 
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The FSEs potentially misrepresented herbicide usage. They may represent 
minimised impacts of herbicides on biodiversity as farmers may alter weed 
management regimes in order to achieve better weed control. Or close scrutiny of 
farmers may have led to farmers using less chemicals than they may otherwise 
have done. 
That the wider environmental and health effects were not included, neither was a 
comparison with organic farming. 
Birds and other relevant species such as earthworms were not directly studied 
(ACRE, 2004). 
That farmers may not adhere to restrictions in herbicide use and how this would be 
monitored. 
Importantly, the FSEs raised questions about agricultural practices more generally, 
particularly concerning the effects of non-GM crops on biodiversity. 
Particular criticism of the FSEs were dealt with by the House of Commons 
Environmental Audit Committee who also noted that they were ‘unhappy’ with way 
the North American experience had not been factored into the decisions on GMHT 
crops. Although they applauded the steps to assess biodiversity impacts, they 
criticised the Government and its advisory bodies for their view of ‘harm’ commenting; 
‘… we believe that even if some GM crops with some associated herbicide 
regimes are eventually shown to be less harmful to biodiversity than their 
conventional counterparts, the government and its advisory bodies are still 
guilty of setting too low the level of harm’. (House of Commons, 2004) 
While NGOs have viewed the FSEs as a trial on GM crops, ACRE have always 
maintained that this is not the case, as noted by one interviewed ACRE member: 
‘The purpose of the farm scale evaluations is to test the effect on farmland 
biodiversity of change in management practices associated with the use of 
herbicide tolerant crops. This is not a GM issue and it is irrelevant whether 
the crop is GM or not’. 
For industry the FSEs were also not about a ‘trial of GM’. The abc (see Section 3.3.2) 
in their statement on the results commented that: 
‘genetic modification is a tool which can be used in different ways with 
different management practises resulting in different outcomes’, further 
adding that ‘none of the studies published this year support the banning of 
any GM crops’. (abc web site) 
That the FSEs provide only part of the environmental impact assessment has been 
recognised by Government who have stated that they ‘are only one part of the 
decision-making framework’ (DEFRA 2002a). Although, as the only remaining 
concern of ACRE in their scientific assessment of the commercialisation of the GM 
crops has been potential risks to biodiversity associated with the use of herbicides, 
there is limited room for manoeuvre within the Government’s obligations to comply 
with the EU directive. 
3.1.1.2 The GM Science Review 
The Science Review was specifically concerned with the potential use of GM crops in 
the UK and did not aim to be an exhaustive survey of all that is known. As part of its 
remit it was ‘driven’ by public interests and concerns and gave special attention to 
uncertainties, unknowns and gaps in knowledge. It examined what is the evidence for 
harm and also the evidence of absence of harm (GM Science Review Panel, 2003). 
The panel was chaired by the Governments chief scientist and the evidence was 
assessed by a broad range of specialists, non-specialists and social scientists. Using 
a consistent framework the following aspects were considered: 
How reliable GM plant breeding is 
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The safety of food and animal feed derived from GM crops 
Environmental impacts 
Gene flow, detection and impact 
Key findings of the report were: 
that there were no known health effects from GM foods, but that ‘absolute safety does 
not exist’ 
regulation should proceed on a case-by-case basis 
further research is needed on food allergies, potential changes in soil ecology, 
farmland biodiversity and the consequences of gene flow. 
The report concluded that there was no evidence to support an outright ban on 
growing GM crops, but neither should there be blanket approval. It stressed the way 
uncertainties are part of the introduction of any new technology. 
The report was considered by both sides of the debate to be in support of their 
particular viewpoint. In their response to the report the anti-GM lobby commented that 
it recognised the limitations of the technology and testing regime and reiterated their 
concerns about the experimental nature of such a new technology. English Nature 
was encouraged by the way it highlighted the potential effect on farmland wildlife as a 
key issue. Industry representatives welcomed the confirmation of the requirement of a 
case by case approach to regulation. They felt that the report endorsed their view that 
there are no expected or observed effects on health and that the crops were safe. 
This was endorsed by the authors of the report, who point out that the root of the 
problem is not the GM crops but the herbicide regime (Giles, 2003). 
3.1.1.3 The Economics Study 
At the same time as the Science Review, a study of the economics was also 
commissioned. Like the Science Review the study considered the views of experts 
and the wider public and was carried out by a multidisciplinary team. It also 
considered the economic impacts in other countries. The report did not take a 
conventional approach to cost benefit analysis, rather it assessed the costs and 
benefits of GM crops in the light of their impact on a number of policy objectives – 
agricultural policy and the environment; rural policy; science, innovation and 
competition policy; policy on food safety and quality, and international development 
policy (Strategy Unit, 2003). Adopting a scenario approach, the study considered both 
present day GM crops and those which could be on the market in the next 10-15 
years. Their analysis considered how the impact of GM crops would be felt across 
five different potential futures. 
The study concluded that: 
A future with or without GM crops will entail trade-offs between costs in one area and 
benefits in another. For example, between the impacts on conventional or organic 
farmers, or between extensive costly testing and discouraging industry from 
risking investment in new and potentially useful technologies. This will inevitably 
involve value judgements. 
Any economic benefit is likely to be limited in the short-term. 
Public and consumer attitudes are of central importance, for example, in limiting 
demand for GM crops or demanding segregation of GM and non-GM products. 
There is significant potential for benefits from future developments, but current crops 
would not yield significant benefits and did not have significant benefits for 
consumers. 
International implications could be significant of UK or EU decisions. 
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The report drew attention to the lack of research on the economic and environmental 
impacts of conventional and organic farming, thus making it difficult to establish a 
baseline. It called for further research, recommending that ‘a stronger evidence base 
be built on alternatives to the commercial cultivation of GM crops’ to provide a 
benchmark for satisfactorily analysing the costs and benefits. The report also calls for 
further research on the ‘sociology of attitudes to GM crops and foods’ and into the 
costs and benefits of GM crops in developing countries. 
Policy actors from both sides of the GM debate drew out aspects of the report that 
supported their view. For environmental NGOs the report was perceived as a step 
towards the Government ending its commitment to GM crops and considered that it 
confirmed their view that there is little economic justification for commercialisation of 
GM crops (see for example, FOE press release 11.7.03). The industry alliance, the 
abc, stated that they ‘welcome the publication of the Strategy Unit’s Economic report 
on GM crops and fully agree that existing commercial GM crops would offer ‘cost and 
convenience advantages to UK farmers’ when introduced commercially’ (abc press 
release 11th July 2003). 
3.1.1.4 Research endorsing views 
Research is therefore not simply providing scientific evidence, it is being used to 
endorse different opinions and further fuel debates. The results of the FSEs have 
been welcomed by all policy actors and both sides of the debate have used the 
results to highlight their own position on GM crops. The Welsh Assembly considered 
the results vindicate their anti-GM position commenting: 
‘It would appear that the outcome of the FSEs supports the Assembly 
stance of taking the most restrictive approach to planting GMO crops’. 
(Minister for Environment, Planning and Countryside, Carwyn Jones, press 
release 16.10.03). 
Environmental NGOs and consumer groups have been ‘shocked’ by the effect on 
wildlife and have called for the GM crops to be banned (BBC news 16.10.03), 
whereas industry representatives emphasised the importance of the FSE for 
considering farming practices. Industry welcomed the FSEs results for adding to the 
existing scientific information on crop management, however they also pointed out 
that all farming methods have an impact on the environment. While environmental 
NGOs, the Environmental Audit Committee and the former environment Minister Mr. 
Meacher, have called for further research as the research on maize used the 
subsequently banned chemical atrazine, industry representatives have challenged 
this view. For example, drawing on further analysis led by scientists who analysed the 
FSE results that were not influenced of atrazine, the abc comments that the 
withdrawal of artrazine would reduce but not eliminate the benefits of GMHT maize. 
This endorsed the view of ACRE (abc, 2004). 
The same research is often being used to support opposing arguments. For example, 
groups such as the Soil Association cite both the English Nature (Orson, 2002) and 
EU reports (Eastam & Sweet, 2002) on gene flow to demonstrate that there is no way 
that GM crops and non-GM crops can ever coexist. Whereas industry consider such 
reports simply demonstrate the need for higher thresholds on contamination. Further, 
distrust in the presentation of research evidence has caused policy actors to draw on 
their own research into the use of GM crops in other countries, such as the USA and 
Canada. For example, the Soil Association points to the North American Farmers 
experiences of widespread contamination of the agricultural and food sector and 
difficulties with liability (Soil Association, 2002). The industry body, the abc, point to 
overseas evidence supporting their view that ‘the use of GM technology can have real 
and tangible benefits to farming and the environment. They note that many of the 
potential ‘costs’ associated with GM crops are not specific to agricultural 
biotechnology, but are similar or identical to those associated with the introduction of 
any new agricultural practice’ (abc web site). 
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3.1.1.5 Research as a basis for decision making 
A more open approach has led the Government to concede that current research 
may be inadequate for making decisions on commercialisation. That there are 
differing views on the research has been acknowledged. However, while the GM 
Science Review found that there was no scientific case for not commercialising GM 
crops, there remains concern over the whether research agendas reflect the public 
interest and to what extent they encompass the social, economic and political aspects 
of GM crop technology. 
For all policy actors research is a necessary part of precaution, but it is rarely 
conclusive and frequently highly contested. There is also concern that not enough 
research is being done. Key issues for further research include gene flow to bacteria 
in soils or human guts; pest and insect resistance, recombination of viruses or 
bacteria to produce ‘super viruses’; direct effects of toxins on beneficial bacteria, 
insects etc and potential health risks, for example allergies. Gene-flow is perceived as 
a key problem area and as a result risk research issues and assessment are 
focussing on gene-flow and contamination of GM crops by non-GM. There is also 
concern that there should be more diversity of expertise involved in research. 
Concern over the independence and hence trustworthiness of GM research has led 
to some policy actors insisting that more independent public sector research is 
carried out. Research on alternative approaches to GM agriculture is also considered 
to be seriously under funded. The Five Year Freeze for example, comments that 
while in 2000 £4.4 million has been spent on the FSEs only £2.1 million was spent on 
organic farming research (Five Year Freeze, 2001). 
3.1.1.6 Research as part of an on-going learning process 
The complexity of the potential impact of GM crops on the environment and society 
has been highlighted by current research. For example, the Science Review notes 
that ‘We are limited in our ability to predict ecological changes in complex systems’ 
and that there is a ‘major need for policymakers to understand how physiological, 
social and political environment will interface with the new technologies in order to 
predict potential environmental outcomes.’ (GM Science Review Panel, 2003). As the 
Government commissions more research the need for areas of further research are 
highlighted. For example, the Farms Scale Evaluations not only provided information 
on growing HTGM crops, but also highlighted broader issues concerning agriculture 
and the environment. Future scientific and socio-economic research will be informed 
by the results of the FSEs, the Science Review and the economics study. They will 
potentially enable investigations that contribute to a wider view of environmental 
impacts and are contributing to a broader view of ‘harm’ (see also Section 3.2.2.2). 
The FSEs resulted in a new approach to research in the UK and set an example for 
future research. Their high profile led to a demand for every aspect of the research to 
be open to scrutiny and for details, such as the location of the experiments, to be 
publicly available. They have been heralded as an example of ‘best science’ 
(Research Fortnight, 29.10.03). That is, unlike ‘normal science’ where researchers 
have to make the best of what little resources they have access to, particular 
attention was given to every aspect of the FSEs. For example, financial resources 
were found when needed and measures were undertaken to ensure people with 
vested interests were not on the peer review panel. 
There is a continuing process of broadening research agendas through both the 
ACRE and the AEBC assessment processes. These bodies have highlighted gaps in 
knowledge and failings in research policies, such as the balance between public and 
privately funded research. New government initiatives to involve the wider community 
in assessment of the available information have highlighted key areas for research, 
and the importance of supporting research to ensure effective risk assessment. 
3.1.2 Risk assessment 
In the UK each region – England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, has its own 
Competent Authority who relies on the advice of the Advisory Committee on 
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Releases to the Environment (ACRE) and the Advisory Committee for Novel on Novel 
Foods and Processes (ACNFP). Risk assessment in the UK has focussed on the 
commercialisation of herbicide tolerant crops and conventional agricultural practices 
have provided the comparison. ACRE is responsible for reviewing all applications to 
release and market GMOs and provides advice to the Ministers on the risks to human 
health and the environment. In 1999, following concerns over the impacts on 
biodiversity from organisations such as English Nature and environmental NGOs, the 
Government sought to widen its risk assessment procedures to include agro-
ecological expertise. Consequently ACREs remit was broadened, as experts in farm 
systems and ecology were appointed (see also Section 3.2). The ACNFP is a non-
statutory, independent body of scientific experts that advises the Food Standards 
Agency (FSA) on any matters relating to novel foods. It carries out safety 
assessments of any novel food or process submitted for approval under the EC Novel 
Food Regulation. 
The majority of ACRE’s work involves assessing the risks associated with GM plants 
(ACRE, 2003a). They have produced a number of reports to improve the quality of 
applications, assessment and monitoring of GM crops (see ACRE web site). ACRE 
acknowledge that more research is required beyond that of the FSEs, for example on 
soil biodiversity, however, they remain unchanged over their former judgement that 
the GM crops grown in the FSEs are no more of a risk than their equivalent 
conventionally bred crops. 
ACRE considers the use of practical options to managing risks, such as preventing 
cross-pollination through removing flower heads (Science Review Panel, 2003). The 
committee comments that their approach is to assume that a hazard will occur and to 
therefore focus on the consequences. The committee admits that their approach is 
qualitative in nature as the likelihood of harmful effects being realised, and the 
severity, may be severe, low or negligible, (ACRE Feb. 2001). Through advice and 
reports, ACRE is employing measures to implement precaution both at an early stage 
in the development of GM crops and in the field. For example, they has issued 
guidance on environmental harm in an attempt to improve the quality of applications 
submitted for approval (ACRE, 2002). The focus is on the scientific aspects of harm 
e.g. severity, irreversibility, and uniqueness, rather than broader responses such as 
distrust, equity or legal aspects. Following a consultation exercise, ACRE has more 
recently published guidance on the design of post-market monitoring plans (ACRE, 
2004). Yet, despite ACRE’s assurances, critics remain sceptical over the ability of the 
regulations to control GM crops. Incidents such as when, in 2002, Bayer Crop 
Science inadvertently planted GM rape seed in trial sites in England and Wales that 
contained antibiotic material, only add to the mistrust. Assurances by Government 
that rules will be tightened for future trials, following recommendations by ACRE 
(2003a), have not alleviated these fears. 
For several policy actors the risk assessment process does not go far enough. For 
example, Scottish Natural Heritage in their response to the consultation on 
implementation of Directive 2001/18/EC in October 2001 comments that: 
‘risk assessment should take into account any likely changes in husbandry 
which would count as indirect and delayed effects’. Scottish Natural 
Heritage (2001). 
They were concerned that new weed problems may not be seen as an environmental 
impact, yet could result in changes in management practices that affect biodiversity 
and the environment. They call for indirect impacts, such as weed or volunteer 
problems to be assessed in environmental risk assessment and also the monitoring 
plans. 
The limited remit of ACRE was also been commented on by the NFU (1998). They 
argue that advisory panels should formally take account of the wider farming and 
environmental implications when granting consents to market products. They suggest 
applying principles similar to those for agrochemical approvals. The Government 
advisory bodies JNCC/EN also consider rigorous risk analysis should be taken 
further. That research should include the risks to biodiversity of changes in 
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agricultural practices, soil processes and other land and water use. They have 
particular concern for risks to the native biodiversity and feel the use of GMOs should 
not promote further agricultural intensification. One scientist interviewed commented 
that such risks should be acceptably low, i.e. should not jeopardise native species or 
other species in the food web, and there should be adequate safeguards against 
gene flow between native organisms and GMOs (Johnson, 2001). 
For consumer groups and environmental NGOs, that risk assessment focuses on the 
science and excludes wider socio-economic impacts is unacceptable. Further, they 
argue that a government risk assessment should be carried out at a much earlier 
stage in the development process of a technology and include an assessment of 
costs and benefits. Some of the concerns over assessment of GM crops are 
demonstrated by the case of T25 maize. 
3.1.2.1 T25 maize 
T25 maize – Chardon LL, has been the basis of a hotly contested issue about the 
scientific evidence on which approval decisions have been based (see FoEE, June 
2002). Concern over the approvals process of Aventis T25 maize was instigated by 
Friends of the Earth (FOE) in 2000, which launched a campaign to prevent it from 
being added to the National Seed List. Although the Welsh Assembly had objected to 
it being added, they were overruled by the UK Government. FOE challenged the 
addition to the seed list using the 1982 Seed Regulations, which allow anyone with 
‘sufficient interest’ to raise an objection. They called for a public hearing which was 
indefinitely adjourned in November 2000 when it was established that Aventis had 
failed to carry out adequate basic tests. It was re-opened in April 2002. 
At the hearing a number of campaigners criticised the scientific evidence for the 
maize approval, which was originally given authorisation under directive 90/220/EEC 
in 1998. However, critics of the hearing were concerned about the lack of publicity, 
the way the event was run and the narrow interpretation of ‘the science’ being used. 
They expressed concern that the Chairman of the event insisted that only the 
scientific evidence could be considered, thereby divorcing the science from the social 
and ethical implications (Ho, 2002). 
The additional evidence gathered for the hearing was forwarded to ACRE and the 
Committee on Novel foods. Despite further concerns being raised by the Institute of 
Science and Society about horizontal gene transfer, hazards of the promoter and 
transgene instability, ACRE remain convinced that the risk to health and the 
environment from importation and processing of the maize is no different from that of 
conventional maize (ACRE, 2003a). The crop has yet to be placed on the national list 
and the associated herbicide has also not yet received approval under the pesticide 
regulations. 
Thus, despite assurances from ACRE, not all policy actors were convinced of the 
safety aspects of T25 maize. For the Government the T25 maize case has also 
highlighted its concern that safety issues are being raised at a late stage in the 
process. They therefore proposed that representations on safety issues only be made 
at an early stage in the process and that those affected by the National List, i.e. 
anyone with concern over growing the new crops, could still make a representation 
but only in relation to whether the variety is distinct, uniform and stable, and has a 
value for cultivation, i.e. strictly on the core subject matter of the national listing 
system. 
3.1.2.2 The new Deliberate Release Directive 
Following the EU adoption of the new deliberate release directive 2001/18/EC, In 
England the Genetically Modified Organisms (Deliberate Release) Regulations 2002 
were brought into force on 17th October 2002. Similar regulations came into force in 
December 2002 for Scotland and Wales and for Northern Ireland in April 2003. Prior 
to this two public consultations were held (see DEFRA web site). The first involved 
comments from the public on general issues raised by the new directive. In England, 
these were then used to inform the drafting of the regulations which were subjected to 
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further consultation (see DEFRA, 2002b, 2001). Consultation exercises were also 
held in the devolved administrations. 
The strengthening of environmental assessment under Directive 2001/18/EC has 
received support from all policy actors, particularly now that environmental risk 
assessment includes ‘direct or indirect, immediate or delayed’ effects of GMOs. This 
was evident in the responses to the consultation on the implementation of the 
Directive (DEFRA, 2001) and in the interviews. Some policy actors, however, were 
concerned that a sound scientific basis for assessment of health and environmental 
risks was not yet available, particularly a scientific understanding of agricultural 
ecology and the cumulative effects in the food-chain. 
Industry was concerned that the new directive would mean a tougher system that 
would impede development of the technology, leaving them at a competitive 
disadvantage. Environmentalists, on the other hand, welcomed a more precautionary 
regime but felt it did not go far enough (DEFRA, 2002b). For environmental NGOs the 
new directive does not adequately address socio-economic and ethical issues. They 
argue that these issues should be considered alongside the science-based issues. 
The AEBC has also been critical of this aspect (see AEBC 2001b). While industry 
welcome the use of objective scientific evidence and the case-by case-approach, 
they remain concerned that unreasonably stringent demands may be placed on 
applicants. Representatives are keen to point out that ‘predicting the future is always 
uncertain’ (Moses, undated). They advocate that the regulations should stress that 
the risk assessment should be kept proportional to the risk, and that they should not 
be used as a means for delaying the approvals for non-scientific reasons. In their 
view, socio-economic issues should be dealt with at a broader level than individual 
applications (DEFRA 2001). 
The public consultation for Part B consents under regulation 18(b) of the directive is 
broadly welcomed. In the consultation on the Directive this issue received a high 
response with a broad variety of ways being suggested to engage with the public. 
However, none of these are reflected in the implemented directive, which relies on 
advertisements in newspapers rather than open public meetings or letters to councils 
and groups. While industry supported public consultation, they are clear in their view 
that public responses should only be allowed on well founded scientific environmental 
or public health concerns, and that consultation should only apply to Part B consents 
and not Part C. They expressed concern that consultation arrangements should not 
be misused to delay decisions (DEFRA, 2002b) 
3.1.2.3 Crop applications 
A number of applications for Part C consent are waiting approval under the Deliberate 
Release Directive, of which some are for herbicide tolerant GM crops which might be 
grown in the UK. GM herbicide tolerant maize (T25) already has Part C approvals 
and following the FSEs the advice from ACRE remains unchanged. 
The UK CA has been responding to assessment reports from rapporteur CAs. It has 
found applications to be inadequate and has requested further information and 
conditions to any consent, indicating a UK commitment to ensure that the traceability 
and labelling regulations can be properly implemented. For example, Monsanto’s 
application to the Netherlands for the import of seed and processing for food and feed 
of Roundup Ready (glyphosate tolerant) oilseed rape (GT73) applied for by 
Monsanto. The UK CA has requested: 
DNA sequences of the plant genome on either side of the GM insert site and that a 
risk assessment be carried out on the potential for activation or inactivation of any 
genes identified. 
Clarifications on the use of EcoRI in the molecular characterization as there are 
inconsistencies in the molecular data presented. 
Further details of standard operating procedures that will be used to ensure the seed 
is not spilled during transit. 
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Further consideration is given to post-market monitoring plans to monitor for the 
presence of feral GT73 OSR in imports and during processing and between these 
locations. Also proposals for action should the feral GT73 be identified. 
That the consent holder should be more pro-active and approach end users directly 
to ask if they have observed any effects on post-market monitoring. Results 
should be reported to the CA every 6 months for the first 3 years of consent. 
3.1.3 Risk management 
The Government has consulted on post-market (post-release) monitoring as part of 
the implementation the new directive (ACRE, 2003b) and as noted earlier, ACRE has 
now published guidance. The Supply Chain Initiative on Modified Agricultural Crops 
(SCIMAC) a joint farmer and industry initiative, already have a voluntary code of 
practice that requires farmers to conduct post-release monitoring and report on 
unexpected effects. 
There is an increasing awareness among all policy actors of the importance of farm 
management for GM crops. Both the Science Review and the economics study note 
the potential impact of changes in farm management practices. The Science Review 
highlighted the importance of effective management in a precautionary approach, i.e. 
to continue to develop safety assessment technology, effective surveillance, 
monitoring and labelling. The authors note that ‘an important uncertainty is how 
farmers would apply the technology in the field’ (GM Science Review Panel, 2003). 
They further note that ‘There is a clear need for more research in these areas 
(farmer’s practices) to monitor uptake and application of new technologies in general 
and GM crops in particular’. The panel also commented on the way that wider 
pressures from outside the UK will have an impact, stating that: 
‘The key uncertainties around environmental impact are likely to be 
principally indirect. Economic factors (at micro and macro level) will drive 
decisions at farm and regional level and hence lead to potential indirect 
effects. Changes in EU agricultural regimes are likely to be far more 
significant causes of such indirect effects’. 
Industry is not opposed to monitoring. Their representatives comment that they are 
used to the idea of post-release monitoring because of their past experience with 
pesticide products. For example, one representative commented that the pesticide 
model has worked well and that the model for GM crops could be similar. Industry 
point to the way crops are grown elsewhere in the world and how we are learning 
from their experiences. 
In the consultation response to the new Directive, effects that people wished to have 
monitored included the impacts on wildlife and biodiversity; impacts of the GMO itself; 
impacts of crop management; economic impacts; cumulative effects; resistance e.g. 
weed, fungicide insect etc. Respondents also suggested that monitoring measures 
should be included for unanticipated effects and that monitoring should be carried out 
by an independent body, although others felt that this should not mean increased 
expenses are incurred (DEFRA 2001). The adequacy of monitoring long-term effects 
was also a cause for concern. 
The NFU support the need for post-release monitoring and call for the introduction of 
a statutory regime. Post-release monitoring and future management practice 
requirements are a particular concern for farmers. Although they feel risks of the 
introduction of biotechnology are considered low, they have concerns about the 
integrity of the food chain and impacts on farming efficiency. Of concern is the 
transfer of herbicide resistance to weed species, that there may be a reduced efficacy 
of agrochemicals, and cross contamination between non-GM and GM crops. Of 
particular concern is that methods of zoning or isolation required to control the 
volunteers of new future ‘designer’ varieties of oil seed rape would be unpopular, 
difficult to implement and reduce the flexibility of land use. They note that herbicide 
tolerant volunteers in oil seed rape already cause a problem for farmers. There is also 
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concern that monitoring is only of use if there is reasonable certainty that any 
negative impacts picked up by the monitoring programme could be readily reversed. 
For example, a letter by Scottish Natural Heritage in response to consultation on 
implementation of Directive 2001/18/EC in October 2001 commented that monitoring 
should not be a substitute for risk assessment when there is potential for the impacts 
to be irreversible (e.g. gene flow to native populations). 
3.1.3.1 Co-existence of GM and non-GM crops 
With the possibility of commercialisation of GM crops in the UK, issues surrounding 
the co-existence of GM and non-GM crops have become central to discussions 
concerning GM crops. Co-existence refers to ‘the economic consequences of 
adventitious presence of the material from one crop in another and the principle that 
farmers should be able to cultivate freely the agricultural crops they choose, be it GM 
crops, conventional or organic crops’ (EC, 2003). It also relates to the issue of 
consumer choice and concerns over liability. The Government has stated it is 
committed to ensuring co-existence of different farming types (DEFRA 2002a) and 
has held discussions with interested parties about what measures might be 
necessary to allow for co-existence of GM and non–GM crops. In 2003 the AEBC, 
whose membership covers the broad spectrum of views on GM, issued a major report 
on co-existence and liability issues (AEBC, 2003). 
Co-existence and liability issues have has become a key concerns in the UK. While 
those in favour of GM crops believe that management practices can be employed to 
prevent what they perceive as a small risk of contamination, organisations such as 
the Soil Association believe separation distances are inadequate and that 
contamination is inevitable. They point to research from the USA and Canada which 
indicates pollen can be transported over considerable distances (Soil Association, 
2002). The most appropriate threshold levels for unavoidable or adventitious 
presence of GM material in non-GM crops or produce is the subject of much 
controversy (see Section 3.2.2). In 2002 around 4.1% of UK agricultural land was in 
organic production or conversion (AEBC, 2003). It is currently UK Government policy, 
particularly within the devolved administrations, to increase organic market share. 
The Soil Association are the leading certification body for UK organic production and 
have set their own de facto ‘zero’ threshold of 0.1%, i.e. far below the 0.9% required 
by EU law (AEBC, 2003). The Soil Association are critical of ACRE’s management 
proposals that do not always require gene flow to be monitored, of their assumptions 
that there are no adverse effects as none have been reported, and that health effects 
are likely to be picked up at the research and development stage. They consider that 
post market monitoring should be the responsibility of DEFRA or approved agencies 
rather than companies (Soil Association, 2003). While the organic lobby consider that 
they are meeting the demands of their customers, such measures are perceived by 
industry as an obstacle deliberately placed in the way of commercialisation. 
Both Government and industry representatives point out that there has been no loss 
of organic status throughout the FSEs (interview and DEFRA 2002a). SCIMAC and 
industry representatives further point out that gene flow in plants has been going on 
for centuries and is therefore nothing new (House of Commons 2002b). They are 
critical of environmental NGOs perceptions that any kind of gene flow is damaging 
and are keen to stress that co-existence is a management issue and not a problem of 
the genetic modification. 
The AEBC have taken evidence from a wide variety of expert stakeholders on the co-
existence of the first generation of GM crops that may be grown commercially (see 
also Section 3.2.2). They considered what would be practicable and what should 
occur if GM crops turned out to have a harmful effect on the environment. Their report 
focuses on the need to maintain consumer choice and listed nine recommendations: 
The main aim of Government policy on co-existence of GM and other crops must be 
to facilitate consumer choice to the greatest possible extent, while allowing UK 
farmers to respond to present and future national and international market 
demand. 
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If GM crops were to be grown commercially, farmers growing them should be 
required to follow legally enforceable crop management protocols designed to 
achieve at least the 0.9% threshold. 
If GM crops are commercialised, there should be an initial introductory period where 
there would be intensive monitoring and auditing of co-existence arrangements to 
determine whether and how far co-existence was actually being achieved. 
The powers to impose co-existence protocols should allow for their ready amendment 
if data gathered in the introductory period showed that co-existence and the 
delivery of consumer choice was not being achieved and Government should be 
able, if necessary, to suspend production of a GM crops unless and until 
arrangements were made to overcome co-existence problems. 
There should be special arrangements for compensation for farmers suffering 
financial loss as a result of their produce exceeding statutory thresholds through 
no fault of their own, with a view to an insurance market developing in due 
course. 
Government should use the general approach of the draft Environmental Liability 
Directive to develop the UK’s liability regime for any damage caused by the 
release of GMOs to the environment. 
The Environmental Protection Act 1990 should be amended to allow the competent 
regulatory authority to require environmental remediation where reasonable and 
appropriate in respect of environmental harm caused by the release of GMOs, 
irrespective of criminal liability. 
The Environmental Protection Act 1990 should be further amended, reflecting the 
regime envisaged by the draft Directive. The means of dealing with any 
environmental effects from the release of GMOs, including diffuse effects, should 
be the responsibility of the competent regulatory authority, which will have a 
number of options at their disposal, including requiring remediation. 
Active consideration should be given to the development of protocols for positive 
environmental management of the cultivation of GM and other crops, to operate 
alongside co-existence protocols. (AEBC, 2003.) 
Should commercialisation go ahead, the AEBC recommend that greater caution 
should occur in the initial years, with auditing and monitoring of GM crops. They note 
that: ‘Precaution should therefore continue to be the basis of Government policy-
making, based on all the evidence available.’ Several members also felt that initially a 
statutory annually revisable limit should be placed on the amount of GM seed sold 
and grown. The AEBC recommend that responsibility for overseeing co-existence 
responsibilities should be entrusted to a representative group of stakeholders or a 
Government led-scheme. 
Gene-flow and separation distances continue to be a contested issue among 
stakeholders, with different perspectives drawing on different research to back their 
perspectives. The AEBC (2003) reports that based on a literature survey by the 
National Pollen Research Unit, the Soil Association recommend separation distances 
for 1km for beet, 3km for maize and 6km for oilseed rape. Whereas the FSEs used 
distances of 200m for maize and oilseed rape, while for beet 600m was used. Both 
the AEBC report and the Science Review note that the main factor in successful co-
existence is not necessarily adventitious presence from cross-pollination and thus 
separation distances. Farm management practices, co-operation between farming 
neighbours, political decisions about thresholds and market forces are all likely to 
have an impact. The National Farmers Union is confident that co-existence could 
work in principle with the appropriate protocols put in place, others, are more 
sceptical. They point to the lack of experience in the UK of growing such crops, the 
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lack of financial incentive for the farmers to minimise adventitious presence in other 
farmers’ crops and the experiences of other countries. There is concern that farmers 
would not follow voluntary protocols as they should, and this view is upheld by a 
recent US survey which found that almost 20% of US farmers surveyed had not 
complied with a particular requirement to prevent build up of insect resistance (AEBC, 
2003). 
3.1.3.2 Regional differences 
Not all the areas of the country agree on their policy towards GM crops. As noted 
earlier, each of the devolved administrations have their own competent authority. This 
can therefore present difficulties for the national Government, as they need to their 
obtain agreement from the devolved administrations over matters concerning GM 
crops. Further, following the co-existence amendment to EC directive 2001/18/EC, 
each of the devolved administrations is now able to introduce their own co-existence 
arrangements. A number of counties within England, such as Devon and Dorset, are 
promoting themselves as GM free areas and the devolved administrations of Wales 
and Scotland are applying as restrictive approach as possible. The Scottish 
Government for example, has stated ‘We will rigorously apply the precautionary 
principle in our approach to GM crops’ (AEBC, 2003). For these areas a 
precautionary approach includes guarding against the effects of economic harm as a 
result of difficulties with co-existence of GM and non-GM crops. 
The Welsh Assembly, in particular, is perceived as being instrumental in raising the 
profile of co-existence issues at EU level and putting the issue of co-existence 
between GM and non-Gm crops firmly on the EU agenda. The National Assembly for 
Wales (NAW) is applying the most restrictive approach possible within the EU 
legislation, with the aim of keeping its products distinctive for marketing purposes. 
Although this is commercial position, environmental arguments are used for 
precaution. Agriculture in Wales consists of predominantly small farms and there is 
particularly concern over the potential for cross-pollination of neighbouring crops. This 
is related to the growing scale of organic production in Wales and farms involved in 
agri-environment schemes. To protect the integrity of non-GM crops, NAW served a 
notice on Aventis Crop Science UK (now Bayer) introducing legally enforceable 
separation distances for T25 Maize, using powers devolved to them under the 
Environmental Protection Act (NAW). The statuary separation distances made 
obligatory the SCIMAC voluntary guidelines. This triggered an Article 16 notification 
by the UK Government under the Deliberate Release Directive. The Government 
argued on behalf of the Welsh Assembly that the T25 maize would involve a ‘risk to 
the environment’ and that the Part C consent granted had not addressed the issue of 
safeguards for neighbouring GM crops. (UK Permanent Representation to the EU, 
letter 13.7.01). The Assembly further argued for a broad reading of ‘protection of the 
environment’. They expressed concerns that the Organic Standards Regulations 
1804/1999, which provides for minimum standards for organic production and 
requires an environment in which organically pure crops may be grown, was 
inconsistent with issuing part C consents for GM crops that may contaminate organic 
crops (Annex to Aventis prohibition notice.) The EC has questioned the legal basis of 
the UK Governments action. However, the prohibition notice remains in force as the 
Commission has not advised that it contravenes the directive. 
3.1.3.3 Issues associated with co-existence of GM and non-GM crops 
Who should be liable when things go wrong is a particular concern and a key sticking 
point in negotiations over the commercialisation of GM crops. Farmers’ organisations, 
and those sceptical of the introduction of GM crops, do not agree that farmers should 
be liable for any financial loss incurred. They argue that if the technology is not a 
problem, as the seed companies indicate, then there should be no difficulty with seed 
companies accepting liability. However, companies do not believe they should be 
liable, arguing that GM crops are safe and any problems would be due to the way 
they were managed. The Environmental Audit Committee (House of Commons, 
2004) and AEBC have both highlighted liability as a key issue. Further, the regional 
authorities and devolved administrations of Scotland and Wales have applied 
pressure for the issue of liability to be resolved before going ahead with any planting. 
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A key problem noted in the AEBC report (2003) is that of compliance with any co-
existence protocols where there is no market driver to ensure that a farmer growing 
GM crops will protect their neighbour. In its report on co-existence, the AEBC 
expressed the view that farmers should be compensated for losses and has 
estimated that for sugar beet loss of the organic premium would be £460/ha, for 
forage maize £500/ha, and for grain maize £150/ha (AEBC, 2003). No estimate was 
available for organic oilseed rape as very little is grown in the UK. In the 
Government’s statement on the commercialisation of the GM crops trialled in the 
FSEs, the Secretary of State for the Environment noted that ‘any compensation 
scheme would need to be funded by the GM sector, rather than by government or 
producers of non-GM crops.’ (DEFRA, 2004a). Currently there is no insurance 
company willing to insure GM crops in the UK and, as noted by the AEBC, insurance 
companies do not tend to move very rapidly into new markets. Existing laws could be 
used, however, the AEBC notes that making co-existence arrangements statutory 
would have the advantage of providing greater clarity for the position of GM crops in 
law. Industry representatives have a preference for a voluntary code of practice. 
Previous experience with a poisonous crop, high erurcic acid oilseed rape (HEAR), is 
cited as demonstrating that protocols can be made to work. 
There are many unresolved aspects associated with maintaining an effective co-
existence protocol. Such as what farm assurance and stewardship scheme would be 
best implemented, how to provide an appropriate land information system, who 
should pay for auditing and monitoring and who should compensate for economic 
loss. Work is now underway by government to resolve some of the issues. However, 
as the UK has not yet experienced growing GM crops on a commercial scale, the 
likely extent of the problems are unclear. 
3.1.3.4 Traceability and labelling 
The UK Government comments that they are ‘working with the European Union to 
develop further regulations on the authorisation, traceability and labelling of GMOs. 
They state that they ‘support labelling rules that are practical, proportionate and 
enforceable and in line with our international obligations’ (DEFRA GM web site). 
However, the UK voted against the new EU labelling rules because of concern 
expressed by the Food Standards Agency (FSA). The FSA were concerned that for 
some products the labelling rules would be unenforceable and result in an increase of 
fraud, and that they could have a disproportionate impact on small business and 
there could be increased costs to the consumer. The UK therefore advocated 
retention of the existing labelling rules, but with additional rules on the use of ‘GM 
free’ labelling to take account of those consumers wishing to avoid GM food 
completely (FSA, 2002). The new Traceability and Labelling Regulation ((EC) 
1830/2003) and GM Food and Feed Regulation, ((EC) 1829/2003) have since been 
agreed at European level. In March 2004 the FSA and DEFRA launched a joint 
consultation on their implementation. 
3.1.3.5 Potential agricultural intensification/sustainability 
A common theme expressed by those interviewed was the potential for GM crops to 
increase agricultural intensification. Scientists and environmental NGOs are 
concerned that GM crops could lead to the intensification of agriculture accelerating 
the loss of biodiversity and be in conflict with Biodiversity Action Plans. Intensification 
could result from the varieties used or from management practices, for example, 
winter sown crops can result in very little diversity of plant material. However, this is 
not just perceived as a GM issue, as one respondent commented: 
‘it depends on how we use GM crops and there is good evidence that 
conventional crops affect biodiversity’. (Scientist interview). 
A nature conservation representative pointed out that 70% of farmland biodiversity in 
this country is outside fields (in woodlands and margins), increases in productivity 
could free up more land for biodiveristy, but it is questionable whether biotechnology 
developments will actually lead to this (AEBC 2001a). 
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Conventional agricultural practices have been used as the baseline for the potential 
effects of GM crops. The House of Commons Select Committee on Environment 
Food and Rural Affairs have argued for comparative models of change, reasoning 
that conventional agriculture has evolved through time, therefore ‘Analyses of GM 
technology must compare potential change from that source with predictable change 
as a result of conventional farming’ (House of Commons 2002b). However, 
environmental NGOs point out that little is still known about the environmental 
impacts of conventional agriculture. 
The need for considering GM crops in context rather than as an isolated technology, 
and to be set within a wider debate about the kind of agriculture society wants, is a 
related common theme. The Five Year Freeze for example, argues that GM 
agriculture should be included in any review of the future of farming in the UK. Wider 
landscape implications are an emerging concern (see Pretty, 2002). Thus unlike 
many other issues, the potential for agricultural intensification as a result of the use of 
GM crops, and the impacts on agricultural sustainability, are not such contested 
issues. The Science Review does, however, note that there is scientific disagreement 
about the amount of information required to demonstrate the long-term environmental 
sustainability of GM pest and disease resistant crops (GM Science Review Panel, 
2003). 
3.1.4 Conclusion 
A more open approach has led to the Government to concede that current research 
may be inadequate for decision making on commercialisation and that further 
research is therefore required. The implementation of a review of scientific 
uncertainties in 2003 demonstrates the way that the Government has recently 
broadened its view over uncertainty and is evidence of Government’s recognition that 
it may not have all the information required. Thus there was a shift in the 
Governments position as it has gradually accepted that more research is required 
before a decision on commercialisation could be made. 
The Science Review, while highlighting areas where there is need for further research 
did not raise any fundamental objections to the technology. Both the Science Review 
Panel and the economics study point out that while GM agriculture is not risk free, 
neither is non-GM. The Science Review further highlights the dynamic nature of the 
process commenting that: 
‘Regulatory evaluation needs to keep pace with the challenges posed by 
developments in this technology and recognise progress in understanding 
and knowledge’. (GM Science Review Panel, 2003). 
However, national structures are not necessarily adequately addressing peoples 
concerns, particularly at the local level. This is particularly apparent in areas such as 
Wales and the South West, where agriculture is small scale and organic and 
environmental farming is being promoted. Consequently, not only are areas within the 
UK being restricted by a narrow national approach to regulation, but the promotion of 
an opening up of processes within national government and inclusion of wider 
expertise, and hence broader concerns, is being restricted by the requirements of EU 
directives. 
For many policy actors risk assessment remains inadequate while it focuses on the 
science and does not include broader issues. They remain sceptical over the ability of 
the regulatory regime to control the technology. Despite Government and ACRE’s 
assurances, those critical of GM are concerned about the uncertainties over the risks 
to health and the environment and the co-existence of GM and non-GM crops (see 
GM Science Review Panel, 2003). There is a lack of trust in the scientific judgements 
being made and ‘expert’ perceptions are viewed as not grounded in the real world. In 
this respect, the FSEs provided a focus for peoples broader concerns and brought 
them to the formal attention of government through the publication of the AEBC report 
‘Crops on Trial’. For non-scientists it is often the process that is important rather than 
a specific technology or the science itself (few people are sufficiently knowledgeable 
to be critical of the detail of the science). ‘Experts’ making decisions are criticised for 
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not taking communication seriously. For example, the National Consumer Council 
(2002) comments ‘traditional risk communication typically sees the process as an 
add-on at the end of the risk management process’, exemplified by Government’s 
attitude of ‘we make the decision and then we tell you what the decision is’. Clarity, 
openness and inclusion are considered important characteristics of a risk regulatory 
system and are consequently aspects which attract criticism and affect trust. Further, 
risk governance currently does not take account of the fact that the costs and benefits 
are not the same for everyone, yet the strength of precautionary measures demanded 
is related to peoples perceptions of utility. 
Thus, while Industry view precaution as already operating at an early stage in the 
regulatory process, others consider that it is brought into the process too late and that 
precautionary measures should be more holistic. Improvements in a precautionary 
approach will require a broadening of research agendas to consider conventional 
agricultural impacts if the basis of decisions is to satisfy the needs of those seeking 
improvements in comparisons between GM and non-GM agriculture. The following 
section considers the role of expert judgements in taking a precautionary approach. 
3.2 Expert judgements 
3.2.1 ACRE 
As noted in section 3.1.2, ACRE is the scientific body in the UK responsible for 
advising the Government on the risks to health and the environment of the release 
and marketing of GMOs. In 1999 the expertise within ACRE was broadened to 
include agroecological expertise and members with direct links with the biotechnology 
industry were removed. Today it contains a broad range of expertise from plant 
biotechnology to expertise in wildlife conservation, agronomy, sustainable agriculture 
and rural development. It considers that, as far as possible, it provides neutral advice 
(interview).  
Despite attempts to broaden expertise, ACRE has been criticised, for example, by the 
Five Year Freeze (Five Year Freeze, 2001), for not having a public interest group 
representative or a lay person. As noted in section 3.1.2, stakeholders have been 
critical of the limited remit of ACRE. The former ACRE Chairman has himself 
expressed frustration with the way the regulatory system only allows ACRE to 
comment on the risks and not the benefits of commercialisation of GM crops. He also 
remarked on the impossible situation of ACRE who receive blame from both sides 
and feel they are in a no-win situation. 
ACRE is committed to openness and minutes of ACRE meetings are made publicly 
available on its web site, as are reports and advice to the Government. It produces an 
annual report and clearly states the interests of its members. However, it does not 
generally have open meetings in the same way as the AEBC (see Section 4.2). There 
are close links between ACRE and the AEBC, with meetings between the two chairs 
to consider how the two committees might interact. There has been particular 
enthusiasm for pooling information where the two committees have overlapping 
interests, for example, on environmental harm and liability. (ACRE minutes 13/9/01). 
ACRE also has links with other advisory bodies such as the Advisory Committee on 
Novel Foods and Processes (ACNFP) and the Advisory Committee on Pesticides 
(ACP), who they work closely with on GM crops and pesticide matters (AEBC 2001b). 
Although Acre’s deliberations are not open to the public, opportunities do arise for 
critics to present their views such as open meetings and public hearings. 
Stakeholders have taken advantage of such opportunities particularly in the case for 
T25 maize (see Section 3.1.2.1) and the Farm Scale Evaluations (see Section 
3.1.1.1) to voice their concerns. 
3.2.2 The AEBC 
The Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission (AEBC) is an 
experimental advisory body established in June 2000 in response to a lack of public 
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confidence in the UK on GM crop issues. The establishment of the AEBC is widely 
regarded as an acknowledgement of the need for a broader framework that allows for 
the inclusion of legitimate factors other than just the science. Although industry 
representatives point out that their role in evidence based approval system is unclear 
(House of Commons 2002a, Annex). 
The AEBC has a broad remit, to consider current and future developments in 
biotechnology in relation to agriculture and the environment. It’s terms of reference 
include providing the Government with independent strategic advice; liaison with 
other advisory bodies; advising the Government on the ethical and social implications 
and their public acceptability, and to consider and advise on specific issues relating to 
relevant aspects of biotechnology. As part of this process it is also expected to 
identify gaps in the regulatory and advisory framework, consider the wider 
implications of the lessons to be learned from individual cases regarding regulatory 
decisions, and to make recommendations on changes in the structure of regulatory 
and advisory bodies (AEBC 2001c). 
The Committee consists of 20 members representing the broad range of views on 
biotechnology, from those who are very opposed to GMOs to those who are in favour. 
While some of its members have been involved in GM debates others have not. Their 
occupational expertise includes farmers, lawyers, academics, public sector research 
scientists, public interest groups, philosophers, industry consultant, a writer and 
broadcaster and a lay person. Their interests are clearly declared on the AEBC web 
site. 
The AEBC is committed to openness and transparency. As noted in their co-
existence report (2003), their approach to looking for solutions is to ‘listening 
carefully’. They aim to pay particular attention to social and ethical dimensions as well 
as technical and legal ones. Its chairman reports that the AEBC co-ordinates its 
activities ‘quite closely’ with the Human Genetics Commission and the Food 
Standards Agency (M. Grant, Q. 145, House of Commons 2002a). It consults widely 
on its workplan and meetings are generally open to the public. All documents, 
including minutes of meetings, draft and final reports and transcripts of evidence are 
made available for public scrutiny on their web site. They also make particular effort 
to hold their meetings in different locations around the country. Their transparency 
has been commended by the House of Commons House of Commons Select 
Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, who congratulated them on the 
example they set (House of Commons 2002b). 
The AEBCs work has involved studies on decision making on the Farm Scale 
Evaluations, animals and biotechnology, co-existence of GM and non-GM crops, 
horizon scanning and advising on the formal public debate. Future work topics 
include Global influences on the UK GM agenda, and public and privately funded 
research agendas on GMOs. 
The work of the AEBC appears to be well respected by policy actors and influential in 
their thinking on the issues. Their reports, in particular, have acted as catalysts for 
further deliberations. However, some concern was expressed by industry 
representatives that the AEBC was no longer relevant. For example, one Industry 
representative commented that a committee set up in the heat of the moment would 
just perpetuate the differences between stakeholders and added ‘our perception is 
that the debate has moved on’. 
The AEBC in action: ‘The Crops on Trial’ report and the Co-existence and 
Liability report 
The AEBCs commitment to openness and the inclusion of a diversity of perspectives 
is demonstrated by their report on the conduct of the FSEs, ‘Crops on Trial’ (AEBC 
2001b). This involved an extensive information gathering exercise with public 
meetings and verbal evidence gathered from scientific and academic experts, 
members of the public and NGOs. The information was collected in an open and 
transparent way, with full transcripts of meetings and expert evidence being made 
publicly available on their web site. People and groups who previously felt that their 
voice went unheard were listened to. The AEBC’s methods also allowed for points of 
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concern to be clarified, for example, what answers the FSEs were designed to 
provide. All recommendations from the report were accepted by the Government 
(although the Welsh Government could not accept that the FSEs should continue), 
and two have been acted on – seeking the AEBC’s advice on a ‘public debate’ on 
commercialisation of GM crops and setting up a baseline study of the environmental 
effects of different agricultural practices. 
The production of the FSE report and the subsequent report on co-existence (AEBC, 
2003), was not an easy process because of the divergent views of AEBC members. 
There were several points in the co-existence report where the AEBC was unable to 
agree. For example, on whether co-existence arrangements should be arranged to 
deliver a threshold of 0.1%. While some members felt that in order to respond to 
consumer wishes a threshold of 0.1% should be maintained, others felt that this was 
unworkable and that it was unreasonable to insist that growers meet a threshold 
below the 0.9% required by law. These differences led the AEBC to conclude that: 
‘an independent stakeholder body would face a near impossible task 
initially in getting broad agreement to the terms and protocols, particularly 
separation distances, if it was asked to accommodate a 0.1% as well as a 
0.9% threshold’. 
Figures 1 and 2 map the differences between the two views. They demonstrate the 
depth of view and indicate the limitations faced by multi-stakeholder bodies in 
reaching agreement. 
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Figure 1 A map of the views of those arguing for a 0.9% adventitious presence 
threshold (the arrows link the above goal or aim to the thinking behind that aim or 
goal). 
 
Investigate the extent 
to which thresholds are 
achievable in practice 
on the farm 
A 0.9% threshold is 
workable, 0.1% is 
unreasonable 
Give all farmers the 
freedom to grow 
what they judge the 
market wants 
It should be up to 
individual 
growers to 
produce a crop 
that meets the 
requirements of 
their purchasers 
Most consumers 
accept a 0.1% 
threshold is 
unachievable 
Accurate testing 
for 0.1% although 
theoretically 
possible would be 
difficult to 
achieve 
0.1% would 
raise unrealistic 
public 
expectations  0.1% (‘zero’) 
threshold is being 
used to prevent GM 
crops being grown 
0.1% likely to be 
unachievable if there is 
extensive GM planting 
Design co-existence 
arrangements to meet a 
0.9% threshold 
No objection to thresholds 
below the required 0.9%, 
but they should be the 
responsibility of the organic 
or non-GM farmer 
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Figure 2 A map of the views of those arguing for a 0.1% adventitious presence 
threshold 
The lack of a consensus view on particular issues is inevitable considering the 
diversity of views of members of the AEBC. The lack of a consensus view reflects the 
way that GM is viewed by various stakeholders beyond government. Noting the 
differences provides insights into the different perspectives and indicates 
opportunities for ways forward. Working together has involved the AEBC in a mutual 
learning process whereby they have listened to alternative perspectives and 
considered others analytical approaches. This does not mean that they agree with 
one another or have changed their respective positions on GMOs. However despite 
their differences, influential reports have been produced with constructive 
recommendations for Government on how to address peoples concerns (e.g. AEBC 
2001b and 2003). The reports form part of an on-going dialogue on GM crops and 
how to proceed. 
The following section considers the key recommendation of the AEBC, that: ‘Ministers 
must, through proper consultation engage with the public’ if it is to take a decision on 
behalf of society’ on GM crops (AEBC 2001b, p.15). 
3.2.3 The national dialogue on GM Issues: GM Nation? 
Following advice from the AEBC, the Government requested that the AEBC provide 
further advice on how to promote a wider public debate and how to make best use of 
the results (DEFRA 2002a). As noted by the minister at the time: 
‘The intention is to create a dialogue between all strands of opinion on GM 
issues’. (Government response to AEBC, April 2002). 
There were different views about what a debate would achieve. For some 
stakeholders it represented an opportunity for a process of mutual learning. For the 
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Government it was seen as a way ‘to identify the questions which the public has and 
provide information in response’ (Meacher, Hansard,15 July 2002) and for industry 
representatives as a means for educating and informing people. Nevertheless, it 
represented an intentionally more formal approach to broadening expertise by 
including the wider public in an ‘overall programme of dialogue’. 
The formal public debate consisted of three main components – 1) GM Nation? – a 
wide public debate overseen by an independent steering board; 2) a review of 
scientific issues of GM crops – run by the Government’s scientific advisors; 3) a 
review of costs and benefits of GM crops – carried out by the Governments Strategy 
Unit. 
In April 2002 the AEBC forwarded advice to the Government recommending that the 
debate be held by an independent organisation rather than the Government itself 
(AEBC letter to Government, 26/4/02). At the time The Select Committee on 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs welcomed the AEBC’s suggestions but with 
reservations. They felt unsure of the extent to which the wider public could be 
engaged and how conclusive it would be, commenting that: 
‘It is unfortunate that the crops chosen for use in the farm-scale 
evaluations are not directly used by consumers’. (House of Commons 
2002b). 
Their concern was that the public would be unlikely to perceive much advantage in 
the commercial exploitation of GM crops and that the debate would focus on the 
alleged risks without the balance of the benefits. They recommended to the 
Government that they address as a priority ‘the question of the need to rebuild public 
confidence in science as an instrument of public policy, without which it will be 
extremely difficult to have a well informed public consultation and debate on matters 
such as the future of GM technology’ (House of Commons 2002b). 
On 31st May 2002, the Government announced the intention for a formal process of 
debate on GM crops. The purpose of the debate was not only to help make decisions 
about commercialisation of GM crops but also to assist Government negotiations 
within Europe, (DEFRA 2002b). A steering board was set up covering a broad range 
of expertise including seven members of the AEBC. Although initially only awarded 
funding of £250,000, following pressure from the debates steering committee, it was 
eventually doubled to £500,000. In order to allow the public concerns to frame the 
debate, a series of nine discussion workshops, with 18-20 participants in each, were 
conducted in different locations of the UK in November 2002. The issues generated 
were also used to guide the review of the science and economics study. To facilitate 
discussions, a web site, with links to the Science Review and economics study, was 
set up with background information on arguments for and against GMOs. Anyone 
interested was invited to contribute their view. It was the Steering Boards aim for it to 
‘be a unique and innovative exercise’ and that rather than being an opinion poll, it 
should provide effective opportunities for people to deliberate on the issues (Steering 
Board, 2003). 
In June 2003, ‘GM Nation?’ began to engage the wider public in a series of events. 
The organisers hoped to ‘challenge people to think’ (Steering Board, 2003). Stimulus 
material was produced and distributed to people participating in the debate, including 
a video a CD ROM and printed stimulus materials. Local organisations, Local 
authorities and individuals were urged to plan their own discussions and 
contribute. Debates and discussions on GM issues took place in towns and villages 
throughout the country. Over the course of the six week debate, 6 initial regional 
workshops were held, followed by an estimated 40 regional and county-level 
meetings and a further 629 local meetings (Steering Board, 2003). Over 1200 letters 
and e-mails expressing views were received and 36,557 feedback forms. To gain a 
‘Narrow-But-Deep’ perspective, a further 10 discussion workshops were conducted 
with people who were not involved in GM issues. 
The general findings of the debate were as follows: 
People are generally uneasy about GMOs. 
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The more people engage in GM issues, the harder their attitudes and more intense 
their concerns. 
There is little support for early commercialisation. 
There is widespread mistrust of Government and multi-national companies. 
There is a broad desire to know more and for further research to be done. 
Developing countries have special interests. 
Debate was welcomed and valued. 
(Steering Board, 2003) 
The Narrow-But-Deep perspective indicated that although the wider public are likely 
to share the main concerns of those people actively engaged in the GM debate (such 
as environmental NGOs) they may not have such a high degree of outright 
opposition. 
In addition to the work of the Steering board, in April 2003 a citizens jury was 
organised by the Food Standards Agency (FSA, 2003). The Jury consisted of 15 
people from Slough who addressed the question ‘Should GM Foods be available to 
buy in the UK?’ The jury voted nine to six in favour of GM foods being available to 
consumers in the UK. However, Genewatch, an NGO who took part in the jury, 
criticised the FSA for distorting its findings as the FSA failed to highlight that the jury 
also concluded that more time was needed to understand the long-term 
environmental implications before the crops were grown. 
Citizens Juries were also held by a team of researchers from the University of 
Newcastle (PEALS, 2003). These were funded by Greenpeace, Unilever, the 
Consumers’ Association and the Co-op. The juries were conducted in two different 
parts of England with people new to the subject of GM crops. Their conclusions, in 
brief, were that GM foods should not be on sale, that GM crops should not be 
commercialised owing to the lack of evidence of benefit and the application of the 
precautionary principle, and that long-term research was required. 
Criticisms of the Public Debate 
The experimental nature of the formal public debate has meant it has attracted 
criticism. Academics have questioned assumptions underlying the debate, such as 
the capacity of science to resolve uncertainties and accommodate public concerns 
(Burgess et al., 2002). Consumer and environmental groups expressed concern that 
commercialisation will go ahead anyway and that the debate is ‘just window dressing’. 
Criticisms have been made over the lack of time allowed, the amount of funding for 
the debate and lack of publicity. The background materials were criticised for being 
dull and uninspiring, and participants felt there was little guidance over how to 
facilitate meetings to ensure people were fully involved and their views accurately 
recorded. 
There has been concern over the way the overall debate, including the Science 
Review and economics study, were structured. There was also concern, particularly 
from Industry, that it meant only the usual stakeholders and experts contributed and 
by others that it was elitist. As commented by one NGO: 
‘This was very much an elite debate for specialists and stakeholders’. 
(Mayer, 2003). 
One key criticism was over the decision to appoint the Central Office of Information, 
previously a government department, to manage parts of the debate, particularly as it 
was recognised by the Government and the Steering Broad that it was important for 
the debate to be seen to be held at arms length from the Government. Several 
witnesses to The Select Committee for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, who 
conducted an inquiry into the conduct of the debate, commented on the Central Office 
of Information’s lack of expertise and necessary skills (House of Commons, 2003). A 
further criticism from Industry representatives was that the results were not 
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representative of public opinion. The industry alliance the abc, for example, 
commented that ‘public meetings do not equal public opinion’ (abc 2003b). Their 
chairman also commented that: 
‘Unfortunately, this exercise doesn’t tell you anything new. When the public 
is asked in a statistically valid way, they can see why GM crops are so 
widely grown in other countries’. (abc 2003b) 
In its final report the Select Committee upheld the view that the main element of the 
debate was not fully representative commenting: 
‘The debate also did not engage people beyond a self-selecting group 
which already held views about GM. Thus the wider public was in the main 
not informed by the debate, and nor were their opinions canvassed’. 
(House of Commons, 2003). 
The difficulties of engaging with the views of the wider public have been the subject of 
discussion at subsequent events concerning the process of the public debate. It has 
also been a more general concern of the AEBC. 
Critics, including the Select Committee, also commented on the way the outcomes of 
the economics study, Science Review and Farm Scale Evaluations were released too 
late in the process, so were unable to inform people’s views. The Select Committee 
considered the blame to lie with the Government, rather than the debates Steering 
Board, for allocating insufficient funds and ‘an absurdly tight deadline’ (House of 
Commons, 2003). However, despite its criticisms and conclusions that ‘overall the 
debate was an opportunity missed’, the Select Committee were complimentary of the 
Narrow-But Deep exercise and the general aims of the debate. ‘GM Nation?’ 
represented a learning experience for all involved and many of the criticisms have 
been recognised by the Steering Board themselves. Their Chairman is keen to point 
out that: 
‘When people come to look back on the exercise they might share my view 
of rather a hesitant feeling that it has been a success’. (House of 
Commons October, 2003). 
In March 2003, the Government and devolved administrations responded to the GM 
dialogue process stating that is has carefully considered the findings of the public 
debate, Science Review and costs and benefits study. It commented that: 
‘In deciding our policy on GM crops we have given due consideration to 
the findings of all three strands of the GM dialogue …’. (DEFRA, 2004b) 
While the Government accepted the economic study’s conclusions that GM crops 
may be of limited economic value in the UK, they concluded that future developments 
have the potential to provide ‘wide ranging benefits to farmers and consumers’. They 
acknowledge there are gaps in the knowledge base, but comment that this is true of 
any developing technology. For environmental NGOs, such comments were 
considered to ignore the public view presented in the public debate. 
3.2.4 Conclusion 
Broadening expertise is an ongoing process. Through the establishment of the AEBC 
with a broad remit and widening ACRE’s scientific expertise, the Government has 
responded to new concerns. The AEBC has particularly provided a means for 
focusing and highlighting current concerns over GM crops and has legitimised factors 
other than the science. Of particular concern for its members has been the 
involvement of all stakeholders’ views and ways of engaging with public. The AEBC 
has enabled the inadequacies of regulation and government communication to be 
revealed, and a broader range of expertise to be voiced than has previously occurred. 
The broad spectrum of views represented by the AEBC has not necessary resulted in 
a consensus on issues, but nevertheless has resulted in reports welcomed by most 
stakeholders. It has been influential on Government thinking and action, particularly 
through the publication of its reports. Further, its commitment to openness has set 
new standards. 
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The process of formal public debate has been recognised by many policy actors as 
an innovative endeavour (see for example, Stebbings, 2003). It represented an 
attempt to link expert judgements with broader public concerns for GM crops, and 
provided an opportunity for developing mutual learning. It represented a step forward 
in the conduct of public consultation for policy decision making processes. However, 
before the formal debate the Chairman of the AEBC commented that: 
‘I think the question at the core was to do with whether public debate can 
help to come through the polarisation (of the debate). We believe it can’. 
(M. Grant, Q129, House of Commons 2002a). 
Yet ‘GM Nation?’ has done little to bring views closer together. Although other 
concerns, such as ethics and economics have been recognised by the Government, 
(see DEFRA 2004b), the decision on GM crops has remained one based on science, 
leaving many policy actors dissatisfied. Throughout the formal debate it remained 
unclear how ‘public’ views were to be fed into the overall decision about 
commercialisation. As indicated by the scenario workshop undertaken for this project, 
no decision by the Government on the commercialisation of GM crops would be 
without its difficulties. However, for those opposing the imminent commercialisation of 
GM crops, the Government’s decision was seen to have ignored the public view and 
to be far from precautionary. 
Thus the implementation of new structures, and broadening of existing ones, has yet 
to adequately address the socio-economic or ethical issues raised by stakeholders. 
Further, opening up government processes has yet to result in calming objections to 
the commercialisation of GM crops or criticisms surrounding scientific expertise. The 
following section reviews the views and roles played by the various stakeholders in 
the overall GMO debate. 
3.3 Stakeholder roles 
3.3.1 Government 
As noted in the previous sections, Government is keen to rebuild public confidence in 
decision making. Taking a precautionary approach has therefore been central in their 
efforts to build trust. However, although the formal public debate exercise aimed to 
build trust, failure to adequately address people’s views may lead to the opposite 
effect. The findings from the formal public debate demonstrate that greater openness 
and awareness is not alleviating public fears and that there is a desire for stronger 
levels of precaution. This was particularly apparent in the events held by the Science 
Review Panel. Several participants felt that their issues were not addressed as they 
were deemed to be ‘non-scientific’. Such division between science and non-science 
was at odds with the way that many contributors to the debate viewed GM issues. 
The pressure on the Government to demonstrate that it has taken on board the views 
from ‘GM Nation?’ is pointed out by the Chairman of the AEBC in his evidence to the 
select Committee: 
‘This has been, I think, a highly symbolic exercise in public trust and 
government. The public have put their faith in participating in the exercise 
on the basis of a pledge by ministers that they would be listened to’. 
(House of Commons, 2003). 
The Government has attempted to respond to calls by stakeholders for greater 
participation in government decision making and more innovative consultation 
processes. However, the dominant view of the Government concerning GM crops is 
one of regulation and control (see figure 3) with an emphasis on science based 
regulation. Public opinion is viewed as a matter of consumer choice, (with the public 
viewed as consumers as opposed to citizens). Consequently, appropriate labelling 
remains the key mechanism by which public views may be accommodated within the 
regulatory process. Wider issues, such as the ethical aspects of GM crops, are 
viewed as beyond Government’s immediate responsibilities. 
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Figure 3 Map showing the Environment Minister’s view of the Government’s 
responsibilities 
(Drawn from the minutes of evidence taken by the Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs Committee for their report on the Conduct of the GM Debate 
(House of Commons, 2003); the arrows link the above goal or aim to how it is 
believed that aim or goal will be achieved.) 
3.3.2 Industry 
As noted earlier, the industry representative’s view remains firmly that a 
precautionary approach has already been applied at an early stage in the 
development of the GM products. They therefore question the need for wider public 
involvement and accuse those against GM crops of deliberately seeking to delay their 
introduction. While there is a general acceptance by policy actors of encouraging 
openness during the approvals process, industry representatives feel uncomfortable 
about greater public participation. English Nature has commented that ‘people are 
beginning to realise that the debate is more complex than they thought’ and that 
‘technology is part of public society so there has to be an on going debate, not just 
once and for all.’ Yet industry representatives remain unconvinced. As one 
representative commented ‘industry feels that given time the public will accept GMOs’ 
(interview). 
Industry representatives consider that industry’s role is to foster and promote new 
innovations and hence new agricultural technologies. In response to current events, 
they have been forming alliances and have established a platform for the views of 
those with positive experiences of GM crops through the Agriculture and 
Biotechnology Council (abc). The abc was set up in the early part of 2002 and is 
concerned that there should be a fair debate over GM. It brings together BASF, Bayer 
Crop Science, Dow Agrosciences UK, Dupont, Monsanto UK and Syngenta. They 
state their aims as being: 
To promote a reasoned and balanced debate about the use of agricultural 
biotechnology in the UK. 
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is one of regulation
and control"
ensure new
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and does not effect
the environment
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To work with all interested stakeholders to provide a source of information and 
learning on agricultural biotechnology. 
To play an active role in the public debate, providing information, taking on board 
opinions and addressing any concerns. 
To encourage and share more research to ensure a better understanding of the 
benefits that agricultural biotechnology can offer the UK. 
The abc performs a distinct function from that of CropGen, another industry alliance 
who are industry’s voice on the science. 
The hostile climate generated in the UK towards the introduction of GM crops has 
impacted on the biotechnology sector more generally. Companies are closing or 
relocating their facilities elsewhere and some senior research scientists are being 
driven to work abroad. Companies are anxious for Government to convey a positive 
message for GM crops. Concern over these issues has led the Government to review 
its policy on the biosciences and to reinstate its commitment to the growth of the UK 
bioscience industry and development of new innovations (BGIT, 2003). 
3.3.3 NGOs and farmers’ organisations 
Environmental NGOs are also attempting to influence Government and public views 
by forming alliances to increase the weight of their arguments. They are producing 
critical reports and initiating dialogue among stakeholders. In 1999 the Genetic 
Engineering Alliance launched the Five Year Freeze campaign which sought to delay 
the introduction of GM crops. The campaign invites people to lobby Government on a 
minimum five year freeze on the growing of GM crops for any commercial purpose, 
imports of GE foods and farm crops and the patenting of genetic resources for food 
and farming. Since its inception the campaign has attracted the support of over 120 
organisations, plus over 45 local authorities and 200 shops restaurants and local 
businesses and is heralded as an example of precaution in practice (Willis & Oldham, 
2002). The Five Year Freeze have expressed concern that there are serious 
omissions in the regulatory system, a lack of essential safety research and that public 
consultation and information is minimal (Five Year Freeze, 2001). In total, nine policy 
areas are criticised. The extent of growth in concern in the UK is demonstrated by the 
number of organisations in the alliance, which represents over 4 million people. The 
wide range of interests includes local government, charities, religious groups, retailers 
such as the Body Shop, consumer bodies and environmental organisations, such as 
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. Their common concern is for greater 
precaution to allow time for the implications to be carefully considered. 
Environmental NGOs and consumer groups have also raised concerns over the 
influence of industry. They have highlighted the way that industry is influential in what 
innovations are developed and questioned the lack of publicly funded GMO research. 
They have also been critical of the way companies are being allowed to carry out 
research into any novel innovation without any form of prior assessment by wider 
society. 
Farmers organisations have highlighted the importance of the practical issues 
concerning farm management and GM crops, particularly concerning co-existence of 
GM and non-GM crops. For example, they have been initiating their own farmer 
surveys (e.g. FARM, 2003, NFU 2003b). The NFU, in particular, has expressed 
concern that the influence of commercial companies on farmers should not be 
underestimated and note the importance of explanatory information to ensure 
responsible use of the technology. Like the other stakeholders, farmers organisations 
have also been using their web sites to promote their views concerning current 
events on GM issues. 
Organisations critical of the introduction of GM crops, such as the Soil Association, 
have been adding weight to their view of GM crops through their reports on the 
experience of Canadian farmers (Soil Association, 2002). They have also invited 
Canadian farming representatives to the UK to report to local growers on their 
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experiences. As noted earlier, the Soil Associations call for zero thresholds for the 
presence of GM material is perceived by some stakeholders as a deliberate act to 
erect barriers to growing of GM crops (AEBC, 2003). Prominence has been given to 
the arguments of the organic lobby by high profile people such as the Prince of 
Wales, who is himself a large land owner. Other large landowner organisations, such 
as the National Trust, have also been using their power to establish GM-free farming 
on their land. 
3.3.4 Supermarkets 
UK supermarkets continue to be influential in supporting consumer reactions to GM 
products believing that their customers do not wish to purchase GM food. For 
example, following a customer survey showing that 78% remain unconvinced that GM 
food is safe to eat and 79% would not knowingly buy food containing GM ingredients, 
the Co-operative Group has stated that ‘it will reject any Government proposals that 
allow the commercial planting of GM crops in the UK’. No longer will it allow GM 
crops to be grown on its land, the selling of GM food under its own brand or the 
investment of customer’s money in GM technology (Co-operative News, 2003). 
Generally supermarket’s own brand products are GM free, i.e. they contain less than 
1% GM material. However, the AEBC was informed that they are either at or moving 
towards a 0.1% threshold (AEBC, 2003). Supermarkets do, however, sell products 
such as vegetarian cheese which uses GM material to assist processing. 
3.3.5 Conclusion 
Committees, such as the FSA, ACRE and the AEBC, are engaging in an ongoing 
process of communication with each other and the wider community. There is 
increasing realisation of the need for communication and to work together to find 
mutually acceptable outcomes. The differences in perspective of the various 
stakeholders offer a means for highlighting different aspects of issues. They provide a 
richness of views and the different dialogues are forming part of the negotiation over 
what society as a whole would like to see. A wider range of expertise on official 
bodies is enabling a wider range of views to be heard. It is adding legitimacy to official 
reports and enabling more inclusive and hence less contested analysis of situations. 
The importance of communication is recognised by all policy actors and they have 
been reviewing their communication processes. The openness demonstrated by the 
AEBC has prompted openness by other policy actors and the AEBC reports are 
provoking thought. Those outside Government are attempting to be influential in the 
debate in a variety of ways and although attempts may be far from perfect, the public 
is being given an opportunity to comment in a way that goes beyond what has been 
done before. Web sites, in particular, have become an important vehicle for the 
promotion of different perspectives. Through them industry, environmental NGOs, 
consumer groups and farmers organisations are publicly responding to Government 
consultations, presenting evidence to ACRE and AEBC, publishing reports and 
inviting public comments. Many of the various stakeholders have held, or contributed 
to, workshops and focus groups, and while not necessarily in agreement with each 
other, they are seeking an understanding of what lays behind others arguments. 
By forming alliances policy actors are strengthening some perspectives and 
challenging others. By highlighting concerns and focussing on specific issues, they 
are providing a valuable function in raising issues not addressed by the regulatory 
system and highlighting areas for improvement. For example, it was the initial 
concerns of those concerned with the environment, particularly those of English 
Nature, which instigated the postponement of commercialisation of GM crops and the 
initiation of the Farm Scale Evaluations. Consumer organisations have been 
instrumental in highlighting issues concerning consumer choice and providing advice 
on managing risks that affect consumers (see for example, National Consumer 
Council, 2002 & 2003). The opposing views of Industry and the Soil Association have 
been particularly important for highlighting some of the practical issues and 
consequences for GM crop management and of meeting GM thresholds. Further, in 
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highlighting the potential problems with farming using GM crops, policy actors have 
also raised the profile of problems associated with conventional crops. 
If the Government is to succeed in its aim to rebuild trust, the call by many people for 
a stronger precautionary approach cannot simply be ignored. A wider range of 
concerns than those currently dealt with by the current regulation process would need 
to be adequately addressed. Yet while Government has attempted to respond to calls 
for wider and improved consultation processes, there has been little advice as to how 
to deal with the wealth of perspectives, demands and expectations such processes 
generate. Further, its ability to respond to wider needs is constrained by the emphasis 
placed on science based regulation, both at local and European level, and the need 
to meet the requirements of EU directives. 
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4 Methods 
Face to face interviews and telephone conversations were conducted with a range of 
representatives from Government, farmers groups, environmental non-government 
organisations, consumer organisations and industry (see Annex II). People were 
asked for their views on GM crops and the relevance of the precautionary principle 
and its use. In the initial phase of the PEG project contacts with policy actors were 
made through telephone conversations with a number of people. From these 
conversations information and advice was gathered about other people to contact 
and recent developments. Important documents were identified and advice was 
sought on further contacts. Information was gathered from documents released by all 
the relevant policy actors and from organisations’ web sites, such as reports and 
position statements (see Annex IV). E-mail communications was used for clarification 
of points and for seeking further advice. 
The web sites specifically set up for the UK formal public debate, science review and 
economics study were continuously monitored. The transcripts of the large body of 
evidence submitted to the following parliamentary committees during the duration of 
the research was also used: – House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee 
(House of Commons, 2004); the House of commons Select Committee on 
Environment Food and Rural Affairs (House of Commons, 2003 and House of 
Commons, 2002); and the House of Commons Select Committee on Environment 
Food and Rural Affairs (House of Commons 2002a). Information was also gathered 
from the media. 
The research team was keen to involve policy actors at an early stage of the research 
and throughout the research process to ensure that the research outcomes were as 
relevant as possible to policy decisions. The scenario workshop was an important 
element of our research (see Oreszczyn, 2003). It was designed to capture some of 
the complexity of views on the situation in the UK and to consider potential dynamics 
and interactions that are not necessarily obvious from published documents. We 
aimed to use a scenario approach as a participatory element to engage with users of 
the research and ensure that our research questions and findings were embedded in 
the policy process itself. For controversial topics, such as GM crops, the workshop 
offered a way for different stakeholders to explore different policy scenarios in an 
open, imaginative and non-confrontational way, i.e. it provided a ‘safe’ environment in 
which people could air issues of concern. The activity was not, however, designed to 
look for agreement on scenarios or produce a consensus view on a particular 
scenario, as areas where there are disagreement can provide important insights. The 
outputs from the workshop generated data which was used to inform this report. 
Further, the practical experience and observations and those also carried out in the 
partner countries, were used to inform the design of a further European workshop in 
Brussels with European policy actors, and are being used to inform the overall 
findings of the PEG project. 
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Annexes 
Annex I: Recent events concerning GM crops in the UK 
Date Event 
1999 ‘Moratorium’ agreed with industry while FSEs are 
conducted. 
1999 Farm Scale Evaluations implemented 
2000 EU Communication on the precautionary principle 
published. 
2000 Campaign against placing T25 maize on the National Seed 
list instigated by NGOs 
2001 AEBC publish report on the FSEs – Crops on Trial 
July 2002 Government announces the three strands of the formal 
public debate process 
September 2003 Report published on ‘GM Nation?’ the formal public debate 
October 2003 Amended EU Directive transposed into English law 
October 2003 Results of the Farm Scale Evaluations published  
November 2003 AEBC report on the co-existence of GM and non-GM crops 
published 
January 2004 Final report of the Science Review published  
March 2004 Government announces its decision for the FSE crops and 
the commercialisation of GMHT maize and response to the 
formal public debate. 
March 2004 Government report on the lessons learned from the GM 
debate process 
March 2004 DEFRA and FSA launch consultation on the EU 
Traceability and Labelling Regulations and GM Food and 
Feed Regulations 
March 2004 ACRE publishes its guidance on best practice in the design 
of post-market monitoring plans 
March 2004 Bayer CropScience announces it will not continue with its 
efforts to commercialise GM forage maize in the UK 
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Annex II: Organisations from which representatives were 
interviewed 
Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment 
British Society of Plant Breeders 
Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission 
Countryside Agency 
CropGen 
Crop Protection Association 
DEFRA Biotechnology Unit 
English Nature/Joint Nature Conservation Committee 
Genewatch  
Genetic Modification and Biosafety Research Group 
Green Alliance 
Greenpeace 
National Consumer Council 
National Farmers’ Union 
Novel Foods Committee 
SCIMAC 
Small Farms Association 
Soil Association 
Consumers’ Association 
Welsh Assembly 
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Annex III: DEFRA research projects 
Current research projects 
Farm-scale Evaluations of GM Winter-sown Crops (Winter Oil Seed 
Rape) (EPG 1/5/125).  
Summer 2004  
Strategies for Risk Assessment, Minimising the Environmental 
Impact of Fungal Disease Suppressing GM Bacteria and Plants on 
Non-target Species (EPG 1/5/218)  
Spring 2005  
GMOs for Bioremediation of Organic and Inorganic Pollutants (EPG 
1/5/142)  
April 2004  
Factors Affecting Rates of Cross-pollination in Maize Growing 
under Typical UK Conditions (EPG 1/5/210)  
Spring 2008  
Non-target Effects of Transgenic Crop Plants Resistant to Virus 
Diseases (EPG 1/5/215)  
April 2004  
The Insertion of Cauliflower Mosaic Virus into Host Genomes 
during Natural Viral Infections (CPEC9)  
Early 2006  
The Effects of Compositional Traits on the Survivability and 
Persistence of GM Crops (EPG 1/5/197)  
April 2004  
Environmental Impact of Bt Exudates from Roots of Genetically 
Modified Plants (EPG 1/5/156)  
April 2004  
Assessment of the Distribution of GM Material in Kernel Lots (EPG 
1/5/207)  
Early 2005  
Mechanisms for Investigating Changes in Soil Ecology due to GMO 
Releases (EPG 1/5/214)  
Spring 2004  
Monitoring Movement of Herbicide- resistant Genes from Farm-
scale Evaluation Field Sites to Populations of Wild Crop Relatives 
(EPG 1/5/151)  
Summer 2004  
Determining Risks to Soil Organisms Associated with a Genetically 
Modified Crop Expressing a Biopesticide in its Roots (EPG 1/5/217) 
Summer 2004  
Factors Affecting Cross-pollination in Oilseed Rape Varieties, 
Particularly of Low Fertility, Growing under Typical UK Conditions 
(EPG 1/5/216)  
Autumn 2006  
A Review of Research into the Effects on Farmland Biodiversity of 
the Management Associated with Genetically Modified Cropping 
Systems (EPG 1/5/198)  
Summer 2004  
Modelling the Effects on Farmland Food Webs of Herbicide and 
Insecticide Management in the Agricultural Ecosystem – Contract 2 
. (EPG 1/5/194)  
Summer 2004  
A Generic Mathematical Model for the Integrated Management of a 
Crop Containing Anti-feedant Genes (RG0115)  
Summer 2004  
The Impact of Transgenes for Herbivore and Virus Resistance on 
the Weediness of crop relatives (EPG 1/5/132)  
April 2004  
Completed research projects Final report 
published 
Farm-scale Evaluations of GM Spring-sown Crops (Spring Oil Seed 
Rape, Fodder Maize, Beet) (EPG 1/5/127, 126 and 145) 
October 2003 
The Potential Value of the Field Scale Evaluations in Assessing the 
Impact of GMHT Crops on Birds and Mammals (EPG 1/5/137) 
November 2003  
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Gene Flow Monitoring from the GM Crop FSE Sites: Monitoring 
Gene Flow from the GM Crop to Non-GM Equivalent Crops in the 
Vicinity. Part 1: Forage Maize (EPG 1/5/138) 
October 2003  
Quantifying Landscape-scale Gene Flow in Oilseed Rape 
(RG0216) 
October 2003  
Consequences for Agriculture of the Introduction of GM Crops 
(RG0114) 
October 2003  
Modelling the Effects on Farmland Food Webs of Herbicide and 
Insecticide Management in the Agricultural Ecosystem (EPG 
1/5/188)  
October 2003 
A Review of Research into the Environmental and Socio-Economic 
Impacts of Contemporary and Alternative Arable Cropping Systems
May 2003  
Monitoring Large Scale Releases of Genetically Modified Crops 
(EPG 1/5/84). Incorporating report on project EPG 1/5/30: 
Monitoring Releases of Genetically Modified Crop Plants  
December 2002  
The Risks and Consequences of Gene Transfer from Genetically-
Manipulated micro-organisms in the Environment  
October 2001  
Waste Stream Monitoring of Genetically Modified Micro-organisms  October 2001 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/gm/research/reports.htm#Curr
ent 
March 2004 
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Annex IV: Web sites 
Agricultural and Biotechnology Council 
http://abcinformation.org/index.php 
Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission (AEBC) 
http://www.aebc.gov.uk/ 
Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment (ACRE) 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/acre/index.htm 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/gm/debate/index.htm 
English Nature 
http://www.english-nature.org.uk/ 
The Five Year Freeze Campaign 
www.fiveyearfreeze.org 
The Food Standards Agency 
http://www.foodstandards.gov.uk/ 
Friends of the Earth 
http://www.foe.co.uk/ 
GM Nation – the UK Public Debate web site 
http://www.gmpublicdebate.org/ 
Genewatch 
http://www.genewatch.org/Home.htm 
Greenpeace 
http://www.greenpeace.org.uk 
Joint Nature Conservation Committee 
http://www.jncc.gov.uk/ 
National farmers Union 
http://www.nfu.co.uk/ 
Soil Association 
http://www.soilassociation.org/web/sa/saweb.nsf?Open 
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Annex V: Institutional links in policy learning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional abbreviations: 
ACRE: Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment 
ACNFP: Advisory Committee on Novel Foods and Processes 
AEBC: Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission 
EC: European Commission 
FSA: Food Standards Agency 
NFU: National Farmers’ Union 
SCIMAC: Supply Chain Initiative for Modified Agricultural Crops 
SNCAs: statutory nature conservation agencies, e.g. English Nature 
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